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Preface
It would be just as easy to say what this thesis is not about as it would be to say 
what it is about. Indeed, some would venture to say that most of this thesis is not about 
technology at al, with a paragraph about keyboards here, a footnote about microchips 
there, but rather pages about politics, sociology, anthropology, and so on. I would 
respond that it is al a mater of dehnition, and the dehnition of technology I am 
prefering in this thesis extends wel beyond keyboards and microchips into the vastness 
of al politics, sociology, anthropology, and further stil. This position caries with it a 
conclusion that technology, as defined, is among the determinants of individual, cultural, 
and social change. Admitedly, determinism in any form is considered unpopular, yet 
hom the beginning of this process I have been given no sufhcient reason to think 
otherwise.
This thesis represents my own introduction to the philosophy of technology. 
Begun hom a mere interest, every stage of research, every book, and every article 
provided something entirely new. I have tried to align and condense a smal portion of it 
for this thesis, so the reader should be aware that many, many important thinkers on 
technology have been left out. As a result, this thesis, while stil being ambitiously broad 
in scope for a treatment of this length, represents but a fraction of the held as whole. At 
any rate, it tels a story I believe is worth reading, especialy in a momentous 
technological age such as ours.
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1: Introduction
Now at the dawning of the 21̂ century, recent technological developments have 
thrust us into the digital age, where technology is claiming a totalizing role in al aspects 
of Western society, presenting unique problems and opportunities. In turn, many 
theorists are asserting the fundamentaly unique nature of digital technology, claiming we 
need new ways to think about technology. This is true, for, as we wil see, digital 
communication technologies are a completely new kind of technology, requiring new 
approaches to keep it in hand. It could be convincingly argued, however, that technology 
is technology no mater what farm it takes — that comments made about technology two 
thousand years ago are stil applicable. And stil it could equaly be argued that digital 
communication technology is so diferent a form of technology 6om any past version 
that new theory is need to adopt, adjust to, and cope with its efects - both positive and 
negative.
In this thesis, I wil demonstrate that the solution to the digital problem requires a 
litle 6om both sides of the issue. I contend that while digital technology is a radicaly 
diferent form of technology, its substantive character as a technology has remained the 
same. To this end, I wil examine claims concerning the essential character and unique 
nature of modem industrial technology made by Jacques Elul, Herbert Marcuse, and 
Martin Heidegger. Al of these theorists, regarded as 'founding fathers' of contemporary 
philosophy of technology, asserted modem technology's substantive character as 
revealed by its unique nature. I wil then survey, assess, and compare evaluations made 
by some contemporary theorists, namely Jean Baudrilard, Steven Best and Douglas 
Kelner, Andrew Feenberg, and Albert Borgmann. The purpose of reviewing such a
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general chronology is, I think, useful in that I wil be able to make comparisons between 
modem age theory and curent theory. I believe that modem-age theorists were on to 
something that curent theorists have generaly left behind or ignored, perhaps the result 
of over-sensitivity to the recent unpopularity of modernist modes of thought My 
approach is founded in admitedly basic and, some might complain, naive observations; 
like many others, I feel the constant pressure of technology, and particularly of digital 
communication technology, on every aspect of my daily living.
My observations about the pervasive nature of technology are not my own, nor 
are diey new. In fact, it has become something of a cliché to decry the pervasiveness of 
technology in the digital age. Intemet and e-mail, public surveilance, cel phones, 
geneticaly engineered food - every aspect of our daily living is aided or augmented by 
or, in more cynical terms, has been made subject to digital technologies. Alan Lightman, 
a novelist, essayist and physicist, who is also an adjunct professor at MIT, recently ran a 
feature in  GZobe  Mz;/ entitled "Prisoners of the Wired World," in which he 
observed that “technology was supposed to make us free: Instead is has enslaved us. In a 
world driven by an unquenchable thirst for speed and profrt, how can we rediscover the 
key to an inner life?" (2002: Rl). He continues to suggest that technology has taken on a 
life of its own, and that we need to reclaim our own lives so that we are 'free' to actualy 
waste our time, if we so choose, rather than continualy dividing it up into blocks of 
efBcient activity:
If I have hours, I can work at my l̂top on an article or book. If I 
have a few minutes, I can answer a leter. With only seconds, I can 
check telephone messages. Unconsciously, without thinking about
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it, I have subdivided my waking day into smaler and smaler units 
of 'efBcient' time use, until there is no fat left on the bone, no 
breathing spaces remaining. I hardly ever give my mind 
permission to take a recess, go outdoors, and play. What have I 
become? A robot? A cog in a wheel? A unit of eficiency myself?
(Rl).
Lightmans's concerns are but an echo of generations past. Carl Mitcham and Robert 
Mackey, in a wonderful introduction to an edited colection entitled "Philosophy and 
Technology" and published in 1972, write:
As two students coming of age in the 1960s, we found ourselves 
living in a decade of plastic food, landscapes that resembled the 
printed circuits of a portable television set, and scientifrc toys that 
were rocketed into space to take possession of the moon.. As we 
watched the Vietnam War become an automated batlefield with 
American air power, stripping hoth children and trees of their skin, 
while the evening news was punctuated with advertisements for 
swift cars and laxatives, our minds closed down upon our thoughts.
Yet doubting, and sometimes running, we were always forced back 
to the same thing, more certain than ever of its dominating 
presence, (v)
The possibility of losing control of the very thing designed to provide more of it 
has been the constant contr̂untal voice to the corporate claims of increased efBciency 
and mobility offered through technology, and both voices have been heard ever since
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technology has gained a certain level of presence in both industry and society as a whole. 
Yet in the curent era, when technology is being thrust upon us, when we are urged to 
incorporate technology into every facet of our lifestyle, and when we are taking it and 
immersing ourselves readily in technologies, some thoûit about what the nature of 
technology actualy is and how it wil afect us when internalized to such a degree is not 
only a good idea, but is absolutely necessary. It is my hope that what Isee as a useful 
point of view in modem theory wil again be useful and even enlightening in helping to 
assess the social implications of digital technology.
But what is technology? What do we mean when we talk about technology? Is it 
complex hke computers or cars, or something simple like a flint arowhead, or a reed 
used to extract termites from their mound? Or is technology, in a sense, bigger than the 
things we use? The distinction is crucial, for how one conceives of technology 
determines what issues are considered relevant and important. As we wil see, it is 
surprising to frnd how diverse the conceptions of technology actualy are.
1.1: Technology
Reading and writing about philosophy and technology can get very complicated, 
very quickly. One reason the difGculty exists is because philosophy of technology, more 
than any other philosophical 'discipline', necessarily engages al manner of theory and 
practice, from history and music to engineering and business. Indeed, by virtue of the 
thoroughly pervasive nature of technology in Western society, philosophy of technology 
is inherently supra-disciplinaiy. By the same virtue, philosophy of technology is 
arguably the most important vein of philosophical investigation of the 21̂ century.
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Yet the supra-disciplinary nature of thinking about technology is at the same time 
a problem. The philosophy of technology discourse seems akin to the fields of Babel after 
the intervention of God - nearly every theorist defrnes technology in his or her own way, 
making meaningful discourse about it very difBcult and rare. Criticisms are often weak or 
miss the point entirely due to wildly varying conceptions of what technology actualy is. 
Stil, I believe it is possible to isolate common veins of thought and assessment from 
many différait thinkers on technology, typicaly because they are extracting from the 
same lode. Technology, no mater how you happen to defrne it, stil presents problems, 
as wel as opportunities, that have real implications.
In the field of philosophy of technology - in the frelds of Babel, (few/n - no 
two thinkers defrne technology in the same way. Upon randomly picking up a book on 
technology, one is never sure of what one wil frnd inside. This fact has been one the 
most frustrating aspects of my reading, in that, after waiting for weeks after ordering a 
book through inter-library loan services, I would often be frustrated by the lack of a 
forthright clarification of terms, causing me to cobble together an estimation of the 
author's intentions. Other times I would read a text which claimed to use one definition 
only to act upon another. Perhaps I should not have been so surprised to find such a 
variation in definitions, considering that the participants in the discourse involve the 
entire spectrum of academia and science. Frankly, it becomes a chore when one tries to 
find paralel or even compatible %q)proaches among thinkers of technology.
To make maters worse, most philosophy dictionaries such as the Oxford 
Dictionarv of Philosophy do not even provide a definition of technology. When they do, 
they provide no content apart from a lead to "The Frankfurt School." Of course, the
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Frankfurt School was not a strictly philosophical group; rather, they drew as much from 
sociology and economics as they did from philosophy. Sociology dictionaries, in fact, 
often provide a definition of technology, such as this one from the second edition of the 
Oxford Dictionarv of Socioloev: "A term used rather loosely in sociology, to mean either 
machines, equipment, and possibly the productive technique associated with them; or a 
type of social relationship dictated by the technical organization and mechanization of 
work .." (665).
It is made clear in the above quote that there are two general conceptual 
definitions of technology. The first is that of instrumentalism, and the second is that of 
substantivism. Simply put, instrumentalists generaly define technology as tool, 
subservient to the values established in politics or culture. Substantivists declare the 
existence of something underlying - literaly stanhu — in technology, often an 
essence or an autonomous force to technology that overides al traditional or competing 
values. It is a diference between identifying many 'technologies' or one 'Technology'. 
Each definition is naturaly concerned with certain issues rather than others, yet I wil 
later reveal that the two, while often positioned opposite to each other, can and do work 
wel together. First, however, it is helpful to clarî what exactly is meant by the terms 
"instrumentalism" and "substantivism" in relation to technology.
1.1.1: Instrumentalism
A simple yet inclusive definition of instrumentalism identifies technology as tool 
or instrument. There are a variety of ways to define technology as instrument, such as: 
the branch of knowledge that deals with industrial arts, applied science, engineering, etc.;
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the application of knowledge for practical ends, as in a particular field; the terminology 
of an art, science, etc.; a technological process, invention, method, or the like; the sum of 
the ways in which a social group provide themselves with the material objects of their 
civilization. Instrumental conceptions also include man-made entities such as processes 
or systems. These include economic systems, political systems, or even methods such as 
mathematics, logic, or critical methods. In short, the core of the instrumentalist definition 
of technology is anything that is used by humans to achieve a pre-configured end.
The 'popular' conception of technology, shared with Western governments and 
corporations, is a basic version of instrumentalism where technology is identified as 
anything mechanical or electrical. Of course, some people are aware enough to identify 
any tool as being a technology as wel, from a stone axe to a space shutle.
Divisions in definition among instrumentalists occur around issues such as what 
kinds of things actualy constitute a technology. The most common definitions of 
technology imply some element of human design. Others restrict technologies to being 
material objects, where stil others extend the definition to include other man-made 
processes or concepts, such as the alphabet. Divisions also occur around the issue of 
whether or not technologies are necessarily limited to tools designed and used by 
humans, or if they can be 'found', e.g., a sharp rock found and used for cuting meat, a 
log found and propped up as a ladder, and so on. Indeed, 'found' technologies could also 
include tools being used for a diferent purpose than intended, e.g., glass transformer 
bulbs being used as paper weights, or a botle being used as an instrument.
Despite the varying definitions, al instrumentalists emphasize, or even take for 
granted, human control in the design and direction of technologies, and so technology is
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deemed 'neutral' with respect to its ends. According to Andrew Feenberg (1991), the 
claim of the neutrality of technology implies at least four things. First and most obvious, 
as pure instrumentality, technology is indifferent to the variety of ends it was designed 
and employed to achieve. Second, technology also seems to be indiferent to politics. A 
hammer is a hammer, a steam turbine is a steam turbine, and such tools are useful in any 
social contexL Feenberg makes a distinction here between the political neutrahty of 
technologies and the apparent non-neutrality of legal or religious institutions, "which 
cannot be readily transfered to new social contexts because they are so intertwined with 
other aspects of the societies in which they originate. The transfer of technology, on the 
contrary, seems to be inhibited only by its cost" (Feenberg 1991: 6). The third 
implication, according to Feenberg, is that the socio-political neutrality of technology is 
usualy atributed to its 'rational' character and the universality of truth it embodies.
What this means is that if technology is based on verifiable causal propositions, then 
what works in one society or context should work just as wel in another. The fourth 
implication of defining technology as neutral is that, due to technology’s universality 
(point three), the same standards of measurement can be ̂phed in different setings. 
Feenberg says that because of this universal application of standards, "technology is 
routinely said to increase the productivity of labour in diferent countries, different areas, 
and diferent civilizations. Technologies are neutral because they stand essentialy under 
the very same norm of eficiency in any and every context" (6).
Feenberg is obviously using the narow and popular instrumental conception of 
technology in this assessment, so it is debatable whether or not his list can be applied to 
al of the instrumental definitions of technology I have provided. For example.
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Feenberg's definition would seem to exclude al non-mechanical kinds of technology, 
although one could make a case for technical methodologies to be lumped in with the 
machines. As seen above, however, machines and methodologies are not the possible 
extent of instrumental technologies.
Feenberg's second assertion that instrumental technologies are indiferent to 
social or political contexts is not entirely true either. Even with modem Western 
technologies, political and social ideologies can be chalenged. For the past several years 
in northern India, many hydro-electric projects have been protested and ultimately 
stopped because of the socio-political conflict that arose when rivers - many of them 
sacred - were dammed and their flows impeded. The most contentious and visible 
example of this is the proposed damming of the Narmada river in western India, known 
as the Narmada Valey Development Project, which plans to instal 30 large, 135 
medium, and 3000 smal dams on the Narmada and its tributaries, al of which are 
considered sacred. The potential power and water that would be made available by the 
project is indeed needed to aid in agricultural and industrial development, yet many are 
protesting the potential human rights abuses and the certain population displacements that 
would result, not to mention the violation of the Narmada itself the related pilgrimage 
routes, and hundreds of centuries-old temple. Some of the large Narmada dams have 
been built, such as the Sardar Sarovar dam. Others, such as the Maheshwar dam̂ have 
been canceled or postponed in response to public outcry. The cost/benefit ratio takes on 
new meanings and evaluations when modem Western technology meets with non- 
Westem socio-politics (Roy 1999: online).
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Further to this, Feenberg's third and fourth claim that a technology is universaly 
applicable reveals a particularly Western conception of technology in his assessment.
For instance, Don Ihde's example of Micronesian navigational tools describes them as 
being based on local constelations and landmarks — one would not be able to take that 
tool and use it to successfuly navigate Lake Superior. A global positioning system 
(GPS), however, with its aray of dedicated satelites can be used to accurately navigate 
anywhere in the world, be it on land, water, or in the air. GPS fits Feenborg's four 
implications, but Micronesian navigation tools do not.
On the whole, Feenberg is not entirely convincing in his assessment of neutrality. 
He applies qualifying remarks with respect to technology's neutrality in writing that it 
merely 'seems' or 'is said' to be neutral in these four ways, and he does so for a reason. 
Feenberg is seting up instrumentalists to represent one extreme in technological 
discourse; he does the same with substantivists, positioning them at the other extreme.
He does this in order to position himself in the ‘balanced’ and thus sensible middle- 
ground, and he does so unfairly. Not al instrumentalists and not al substantivists 
necessarily stand where he places them. Of particular note is his positioning of Elul and 
Heidegger at the substantive extreme, labeling them as "apocalyptic" and ultimately 
pessimistic in their assessments of technology. This interpretation of Elul and Heidegger 
is an easy one to make based on superficial reading, and has subsequently become the 
popular understanding. Yet I would argue that Feenberg is ultimately guilty of 
misquotation and misrepresentation, especialy in Heidegger's case. I wil return to both 
Elul and Heidegger later in (he paper. However, the efect of Feenberg's assessment of
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instrumentalism leaves the reader with the impression that every instrumentalist believes 
these things necessarily.
It is in fact quite possible for an instrumentalist to deny any or al of these points, 
as wel as to deny technology's supposed neutrahty. For instance, it would be simple for 
someone to claim that while technology is indeed a mere tool of human design and 
prescribed function, there is stiU an inherent bias toward domination in its design. This 
view makes no claims about the autonomy of technology, or of its essence, but merely 
contends that there is a habit in technologies imbedded in its very design in that 
technology is designed and apphed to dominate - or to help its users to dominate — an 
object or idea, be it humans, nature, or whatever. A gun is designed to put its user in a 
dominant position over the target much in the same way that a smal-pox vaccine is 
designed and apphed to put a patient's immune system in a dominant position over a 
potential smah-pox virus. In either case, technology alows for the emergence of 
asymmetrical power relationships that previously were balanced or, more hkely, the 
reverse. Technology, then, efects change. This view, in the vein of instrumentalism, 
places the burden on engineers and pohcy makers - or corporate interests - to 
coyMczenhbMsfy design and apply technologies. Interestingly, Feenberg adheres to such a 
position himself yet nominahy distances himself from instrumentalism. Instrumentahsm 
and substantivism, it seems, are not as clear-cut as Feenberg makes them out to be.
Yet I beheve that Feenberg's narow account of instrumentalism is useful A)r its 
accurate description of the most common public understanding of technology, which also 
happens to be the general understanding of pohtical and economic authorities in the
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West. As a result, the common view is that technology, being neutral, has no moral 
relationship to the ends for which it is used.
I.IJI: Substantivism
In terms of the general population, there is a minority view which invariably 
denies the neutrality of technology. Substantivists suggest that the tools we use shape our 
individual, social, and cultural lives. Extreme proponents of substantivism argue that 
technology in this sense is the prime determinant of social and cultural change, even 
more so than economic, historical, or even biological factors. As such, means and ends 
cannot be separated and the technical society is doomed to an ever-spiraling process of 
technological conflagration. But not al substantivists are so pessimistic.
Technology in the substantivist sense is often considered to embody a certain set 
of values. In Western societies, for example, substantivists hold the opinion that 
instrumental technologies are merely a partial factor and product of a grander and more 
comprehensive system of rationality. This system of rationality, which theorists tend to 
cal 'technology' or 'technique', is an unique characteristic of modem industrial culture. 
While instrumental technology has been the material counterpart to humans for milennia, 
the increasingly intense ̂phcation of technology in the modem industrial age seems to 
have revealed to many modem theorists a substantive element or essence of technology 
as a whole. This essence is, by definition, universal to al technologies, but only 
recognizable - and problematic - in such intensely technical conditions such as modem 
industrial society.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Hansen 13
Such is the view of most theorists of the modem age, the most prominent and 
influential of them being Elul, Heidegger, and Marcuse. While each defines the essence 
of technology diferently, the similarity of theory among these men is particularly 
interesting when one considers each man's socio-political position. Heidegger was at one 
time a Nazi supporter, perhaps reluctantly, but a Nazi nonetheless. Marcuse, a student of 
Heidegger's, was a Jew who fled Germany in the early 1930s for obvious reasons. And 
Elul was a Christian Anarchist and a hero of the French Resistance. It is incredible, 
given their radicaly diferent socio-political positions, that each produced such similar 
evaluations of technology and of its implications for humanity, as I wil demonstrate in a 
few moments.
It bears mentioning that there is no necessary cormection between the substantive 
position and the essentialist position. However, it would not be a broad generalization to 
say, as above, that substantivists are essentialists. It would also be equaly accurate to say 
that substantivists, as essentialists, are deterministic. But again while these connections 
are more than a tendency they are hardly necessary, just as there is no necessary 
connection between instrumentalism and the claim of the neutrality of technology.
The charge of determinism made against technological substantivists is 
particularly interesting. Technological determinism has been unfashionable for decades. 
Yet in times such as these, when it is clear that the internalization of digital technologies 
at every level of government, business, and of society in general is beginning to make 
significant changes to our culture, ascribing a determining nature to digital technology in 
Western society is compeling. After al, how we communicate, how we order our time.
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what priorities we have, what values we hold, al seem to be mediated and in some ways 
determined by the technologies we use today.
The substantivist position was commonplace during the years around World War
II. However, the furtherance of postmodern theory and its deconstructive project in 
recent decades had eclipsed modem theory and, with it, related concepts such as essence 
and determinism. Essentialist and determinist concepts and language are unpopular and 
dated even among the general public, and thus instrumentalism is favoured as ifby 
default. Perhaps it is for this very reason that the general public disregards the idea of a 
substantive nature in technology, and that technology is rarely isolated as a significant 
factor in social change and structuring, as wel as possibly threatening our humanity. 
Rather, technological advance is pursued and applauded.
1.2: The Historical Problem of Technology
We live in a wired world, or so the claim goes. As far back twenty years ago, 
arguably before the digital age, technology theorists were remarking on the pervasiveness 
of technology, and that we lived in culture so saturated with technology that every aspect 
of daily afairs from the mundane to the most intimate were increasingly technologicaly 
mediated (Dide 1985: 22). But claim about our wired world is true; the pervasiveness of 
technology is not and cannot be in doubt. Indeed, it has been clear since the maturation 
of the industrial age when just over one hundred years ago the phenomenon of 
technology suddenly became an object of interest for philosophers. Yet even as recently 
as twenty years ago there remained a broad gap between the importance of technology to
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the 'real world' and the sparse number of philosophical works dedicated to the 
understanding of modem technology (Durbin 1983: xii).
The philosophical engagement with technology, however, did not begin with the 
modem era. While the issue of technology has become supremely important only in the 
past seventy years, technology has been subject to philosophical investigation since the 
dawn ofWestem philosophy. These earliest of discussions about technology in the 
Westem tradition first occurred in ancient Greece with Plato and Aristotle. In the next 
few pages, I wil briefly outline the technology-related discussions of Plato and Aristotle 
for the purposes of providing a background to modem discussions of technology. The 
thinking of these two men are the source waters of al theory since, and Heidegger in 
particular makes direct reference back to them. However, while these discussions have 
had a resonating efect on our own conceptions of technology, I wil reveal shortly that 
Heidegger points out that time has alowed some confusion and misinterpretation to filter 
in.
1.2.1: Plato
Technology, an English word, has its roots in Greek, meaning literaly 'study of 
an art or skil'. For this reason, Plato does not atack technology as we popularly 
conceive it, namely technology as machine or physical tool. Rather he atacks an aspect 
of tecA/ze (arts or branches of knowledge), the aspect that is imitative.
Plato atacks technology in a number of works, and in particular he atacks 
writing. He likens writing to painting, which, like other kinds of art such as poetry and 
rhetoric, was considered by Plato to be but a mere imitation of knowledge or qpifrgTTze. 
Knowledge was, for Plato, the hipest goal of human striving. It was positioned atop a
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ladder of states of mind, each preceding rung being thought (dfonoia), then confidence 
(pütiy), and finaly conjecture (eftoszu). To be able speak meaningfuly about a thing, 
one must have knowledge of it, to know what it is. But imitative art like painting and 
poetry was branded as conjecture, not able to add to the discourse about a thing, and so 
was not worthy of serious consideration. Furthermore, arts were considered to be 
dangerous to people in that they distracted them fiom what was actualy worthy of their 
atention, specificaly knowledge, as evident in this quote fiom Book X of The Republic: 
This is what I wished to have admited, when I said that painting, 
and imitative art in general, works far away fiom truth in doing its 
own work, and joins hands and makes bosom friends with that part 
in us which is far away fr-om wisdom, for no healthy and hue end.
(603a-b)
In the Phaedrus. writen after The Republic. Plato continues his atack by 
including writing with the imitative arts. He invokes a parable, a meeting between the 
Egyptian god Theuth and the pharaoh Thamus, to ilustrate his point. Theuth was a god 
who invented many things, including writing. Upon presenting this 'invention' of writing 
to Thamus, Theuth announced it as "an elixir of memory and wisdom," yet Thamus held 
a diferent opinion:
'Most ingenious Theuth, one man has the ability to beget arts, but 
the ability to judge of their usefulness or harmfulness to their users 
belongs to another; and now you, who are the father of leters, have 
been led by your afection to ascribe to them a power the opposite 
of that which they realy possess. For this invention wil produce
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forgetfulness in the minds of those who learn to use it, because 
they wil not practice their memory. Their trust in writing, 
produced by external characters which are no part of themselves, 
wil discourage the use of their own memory within them. You 
have invented an elixir not of memory, but of reminding; and you 
ofer your pupils the appearance of wisdom, not true wisdom, for 
they wil read many things without instruction and wil therefore 
seem to know many things, when they are for the most part 
ignorant and hard to get along with, since they are not wise, but 
only appear wise'. (274e-274b)
This parable reinforces Plato's position that writing, like painting, is an imitator of 
knowledge, and also produces imitators of knowledge in people. Indeed, Plato continues, 
always in the voice of Socrates, describing writing's dangers:
Writing, Phaedrus, has this strange quality, and is very like 
painting; for the creatures of painting stand like living beings, but 
if one asks them a question, they preserve a solemn silence. And so 
it is with writen words; you might think they spoke as if they had 
inteligence, but if you question them, wishing to know about their 
sayings, they always say only one and the same thing. And every 
word, when once it is writen, is bandied about, alike among those 
who understand and those who have no interest in it, and it knows 
not to whom to speak or not to speak; when il-treated or unjustly
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reviled it always needs its father to help it; for it has no power to 
protect or help itself. (275d-e)
For Plato, writing, as wel as any other imitative art, is efort in the wrong direction on 
the proper course of human striving. It leads to no good for it does not encourage 
learning, but rather leads to problems like laziness and a reliance of things other than the 
mind.' The question now is whether or not Plato's discussion of imitative arts can be 
applied to technology in general, especialy as we understand it, or if his comments are 
applicable merely to the ancient arts he mentions.
Plato's complaint about the unreciprocal nature of writing can certainly apply to 
technology as we conceive it today, not merely to arts. Indeed, being inanimate, 
technologies are inherently unreciprocal. But unlike specific arts, they do not themselves 
tend to make direct statements that invite questions, replies, or other kinds of response - 
responses that the work itself cannot answer. Perhaps more precisely put, technologies 
are not constructed and intended to be used as a means of artistic expression. Washing 
machines are not designed and used in an act of artistic expression, and if a washing 
machine is indeed built for that reason, it is technological art; this is a bluring of a 
commonly understood dichotomy. Certainly, technologies alow fi)r new kinds of artistic 
expression, but that is another distinction. As it is gengro/fy considered, technologies are 
not art.
Plato's other complaint about how writing or imitative arts invite people to rely on 
the art for knowledge rather than relying on the eforts of their minds or bodies, can 
certainly be applied to technologies today. This kind of argument has been applied to 
computers and calculators, as wel as to earlier technologies such as chainsaws and even
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the printing press. It could be argued that there is not much eficacy in applying this kind 
of argument to modem technologies like the chainsaw or the computer, for in most cases 
the application of a technology is used for the purposes of increased eficiency, as 
opposed to the arguably inefdcient purposes of the arts. Whether or not eficiency is a 
worthy goal, especialy in light of compromises made to the detriment of the environment 
and perhaps to valuable human interaction, is another issue altogether.
1.2.2: Aristotle
Aristotle does not speak of any particular kind of technology directly, but rather 
devotes some time discussing diferent kinds of knowledge, as wel as the nature of 
sdaace and art. This is important for us to know because it was Aristotle's writing, 
perhaps more than that of any other thinker, that shaped early Westem scientific thinking 
and development, particularly because ofhis discussions of cause and efect, and of 
epistemology. How our intelectual forbearers have understood Aristotle - or 
misunderstood, as Heidegger insists - has determined our curent understanding of 
science and technology, of what they are, should be, and how they should work.
In Book VI ofhis Nichomachean Ethics. Aristotle presents the argument that al 
knowledge is directed by choice. Choice itself is made available by the direction of 
desire and reasoning toward a particular end, such that "thought alone moves nothing; 
only thought which is directed to some end and concemed with action can do so" (412- 
413). If one does not desire to achieve some end, no choice for action wil present itselfi
Of five kinds of knowledge or "faculties by which the soul expresses truth by way 
of afBimation or denial," Aristotle names two of special importance: epüfgme and tecAne
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(413). is pure science, or knowledge ofwhat is necessary or universal. TbcAne
is art for Aristotle, or more speciGcaly applied science, and is concerned with bringing 
into existence those things which are capable both of being and of not being. Each is 
bound with and even deGned by its producGve acGon, either asprax&r or fraxis,
or "action," is equivalent to raGonal acGon or conduct in response to a choice.̂ 
or "producGon," involves the raGonal producGon of a thing, just as praxzf is raGonal 
acGon toward or in response to a thing. It too is governed by choice, for "whoever 
produces something produces it for an end.. only in a parGcular relaGon and of a 
parGcular operaGon" (413).
(pure science) and recAne (applied science) operate as equaly useful 
means of ataining truth along with inteligence, pracGcal wisdom, and theoreGcal 
wisdom. Yet, somewhere along the way to the present, likely during the Middle Ages 
and into the Enlightenment, some aspects of Greek techne were lost. Technology is 
indeed stil considered to be applied science, yet not applied science as AristoGe 
considered it to be. Rather, AristoGe's categories of knowledge were confused, and 
eventualy raGonal acGon and producGon became the ouGets of scienGGc inquiry; 
AristoGe's ̂phed science became a subset of pure science, rather than remaining an 
equal partner in intelectual excelence. Art has been considered in recent times to be the 
opposite of science and raGonality - even an enemy - where once they were considered 
brothers.
This confusion and subsequent asymmetrical epistemology known as 
ErGightenment raGonality evolved into the modem Western world-view, characterized 
and enhanced by efGcient and industrious technologies. This asymmetrical raGonaUty
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composed a landscape that began to threaten its inhabitants, rousing equal yet opposite 
expressions of art and thought.
1.23: Anti-Enlightenment Romanticism
As Enlightenment values evolved into industrial procedures, the prevalence of 
technology began to rise. As if over night, the machine-infused life had become a scene 
of struggle and discontent, a scene vividly exposed in the works of many 19̂ century 
writers. In Notes From Underground ( 1864), for instance, Fyodor Dostoevsky makes the 
irahonal man his anG-hero of 19̂ century industrial society. This anG-hero, this 
'̂underground man", is alienated by and Grom technology and the aleged advances of 
Western civilization. Notes From Underground is in part a polemic directed against 
Western utopian raGonalism and materialist ideals that were becoming popular in Russia 
in the mid-1800s, most famously explicated in N. G. Chemyshevsky's What is to be 
Done? (1862). Opposed to adopting Western raGonalism, Dostoevsky suggested a return 
to purely Russian ideals in addiGon to the ChrisGan ideals of love and self-sacriGce, 
showing that the "liberals" miss these entirely (KauGnann 1975: 22).
The growing efect of technology and the technical society eventualy compeled 
Ernst K̂)p to publish der TecAnzA IFoundaGons of a
Philosophy of Technology) in 1877, which stands as the Grst work in the philosophy of 
technology. In this work, Kapp develops the idea of Ozĝa/ÿzrq/eArzozz, or organ 
prqjecGon, where technologies have their analogies in the human organism in 
appearance, 5)rm, funcGon, and even producGon. Technologies are nothing other than 
man exteriorizing himself and returning to himself (Huning 1985: 11). Freud echoes the
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concept of clearly in a famous passage 6om CivilizaGon and Its
Discontents (1930):
Man has, as it were, become a kind of prosthetic God. When he 
puts on al his auxiliary organs he is truly magniGcent; but those 
organs have not grown on to him and they stil give him much 
trouble at times. Nevertheless, he is enGtled to console himself 
with the thought that this development wiU not come to an end 
precisely with the year 1930 A.D. Future ages wil bring with 
them new and probably unimaginably great advances in this Geld 
of civilizaGon and wil increase man's likeness to God stil more.
(Freud 1930: 39)
Marx and Engels too engaged technology, parGcularly in factories and assembly 
lines, G)r its role in the process of ahenaGon. According to Marx and Engels the modem 
individual, and in particular the wage laborer, is deprived of fulGled living because any 
sense of communal acGon or saGsfacGon has been removed Grom his role as a socialy 
producGve agent. Technology, including the market, has caused human beings to be 
subject to it, separating them Gnm their social community and life's work, so that in the 
end they have no ownership over their own lives or their products.̂ Both the obvious and 
the more subGe efects of industrial technology on the environment, on culture, pohGcs, 
economics, and on social and individual ontologies provided litGe room for posiGve 
assessment.
Yet Marx also saw in technology the possibiGty of its employment for the 
liberaGon ofhumanity. This line of thoût, this hope, is caried through the modem age
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by Marcuse. The assessment among prominent theorists in the modem age was that there 
was clearly much more to technology than its mere instrumentality - the consensus 
seemed to be that technology possessed an substanGve quality which determined its 
boundaries. These boundaries were not always the ones intended. The most obvious and 
most often referenced example of unintended ends would be that of nuclear Gssion. 
Originaly sought for the producGon of previously unimaginable amounts of power, the 
process was used to destroy an estimated 270,000 people in a mere two bombings over 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The day after the bombing of Hiroshima, Albert 
Camus wrote:
We can sum it up in one sentence: Our technical civilization has 
just reached its greatest level of savagery. We wil have to choose, 
in the more or less near future, between coUecGve suicide and the 
inteligent use of our scienGGc conquests. (Camus 1945: 110)̂
While this is an extreme example of how disastrous the applicaGons of science 
and raGonality can be - both in the device of the bomb and in the cultural landscape that 
would provide the means to build it — technology was at the same Gme securing its place 
in the minuGae of everyday living, Gnm cars to vacuum cleaners to telephones to radios. 
The common household was becoming a showcase of gadgetry, and people's lives were 
becoming more and more Ged to the technologies they used.
It was not until the surge of technological progress in the Grst half of the 20̂ 
century, culminating in many senses in the events of World War I, that theorists were 
compeled to recogiGze the fundamental diference of technology of the industrial age, or 
modem technology, and its totalizing eGects. Philosophers such as Heidegger, Marcuse,
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and Elul, asserted this unique nature of modem technology, each in his own way. In 
fact, the events surounding the Second World War, to which these men were intimately 
subjected, no doubt crystalized for them their thoughts on technology. For al of them, 
technology had revealed itself to be an autonomous and ultimate threat to humanity rather 
than remaining the compliant and neutral tool it had popularly been considered to be.
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2: Modem Industrial Theory
It was around the time of World War I when discussions regarding the 
implications of technology for both the individual and society exploded. The war itself - 
and in particular, the ideas and practices of the National Socialist Party — could not have 
served as a Gner example of how technology unbound could, and clearly did, have the 
worst eGects possible. Even before the war, many academics were trying to stress that 
technology, and moreover the much less tangible 'essence' of technology of which 
mechanical technology was but a parGal factor, was inherenGy dangerous to humanity. 
Not only was technology dangerous physicaly, but it was also ontologicaly threatening. 
By mediating experience and physical reality, technology was poised to change what it 
meant to be human.
For academics who were either in the midst of or subject to the Nazi regime, the 
importance of technology in relaGon to people was paramount. MarGn Heidegger, whose 
relaGonship to the Nazi party is a constant source of debate and scrutiny, warned of the 
ontologicaly destrucGve potenGal of the essence of technology yet also hinted at its 
paralel potenGal for assisting in ataining authenGcity. Ernst Junger, the celebrated Nazi 
writer and one-Gme German shock trooper, more or less praised the possibiGGes of 
technology along the party line. Jacques Elul, a hero of the French Resistance, 
condemned technology in al forms outright for its blind and relenGess quest for the 
complete dominaGon of al things. Herbert Marcuse, a Jewish student of Heidegger's 
who Ged Nazi Germany with many of his coleagues in the early 1930's, warned of the 
implicaGons of technology, parGcularly of technology within modem industrial society. 
Technology, it seemed, had become the chief concern of the Gme.
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In what folows, I wil briefly outline the theories of technology of Martin 
Heidegger, Herbert Marcuse and Jacques Elul. As already menGoned, these three men 
are considered to be the pioneers of serious philosophical assessment of technology in the 
modem age, and sGl their theories are being applied, although not popularly, to the 
curent situaGon some forty to sixty years later.
By surveying these theories, I intend to draw out certain aspects that are 
transferable to the present age of digital technology in Western socieGes. These aspects, 
namely technology's essenGal character or substanGve element and the historical 
uniqueness of modem technology, can be applied to assess the curent context of digital 
technology in contrast to the curent and more popular postmodern technology-led 
theories.
2.1: Jacques Elul
Bom in Bordeaux in 1912, Jacques EUul grew to be an outstanding student, 
eventualy studying law at the University of Bordeaux and the University of Paris, where 
he eamed his doctorate in 1936. He then taught at various insGtuGons unGl the outbreak 
of World War Two, during which he parGcipated in the French resistance while farming 
to support his 6mdy. After the war, he moved back to Bordeaux where he more or less 
stayed and taught until his retirement in 1980. He died there in 1994 after a long ilness.
Elul wrote nearly one thousand arGcIes and Gfty books, mosGy dealing with the 
maintenance of ethics and theology in a technical society; a radical form of ChrisGanity 
was the central moGvaGon in al of his acGviGes, academic and otherwise, in that he 
advocated ChrisGan libertanan/anarchisGc personalism and poliGcal ecology. Although
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he generaly avoided poliGcal associaGons, he was quite acGve in ecological and religious 
concerns of his area (Chastenet 2002: online).
Elul is recognized more than any other thinker of technology as the paradigm of 
the technological essenGalisL He is often, and properly, characterized as being fatalisGc 
and aggressive, despite his own claims to the contrary (Elul 1990: vi). Technology 
presents for Elul the greatest problem to hinnanity, so much so that the only way to deal 
with technology is to get rid of it — at least in its modem &>rm. A return to a more natural 
and symbioGc relaGonship with nature is the only viable soluGon if man is to come to 
grips with himself̂ society and, most importanGy G)r EUul, God. For the purposes of this 
thesis, I wiU be neglecting a good deal of the theological aspects of EUul's writing simply 
because they are not direcGy related to his assessment of technique, but folow Gom what 
I wish to focus upon. At the same time, I recognize that Elul's theology and cultural 
analysis are entwined, and so it should be noted that this brief summary does not 
represent the whole of Elul's criGque.
In the last half of the 20̂ century, Elul wrote a number ofbooks and arGcles on 
the impUcaGons of technology on modem society and the individual, most notablvThe 
Technological Societv in 1950 - which was discovered and promoted by Aldous Huxley, 
and later brought him fame in American universiGes in 1964 — and The Technological 
BluG in 1990. It is primarily Gom the Grst of these two books that I wil draw Elul's 
descripGon of modem technology and its diGerence Gom earUer forms.
It is vital to reiterate that Elul's chief concern is not technology in its 
instrumental form. Rather, Elul assesses what he cals'AztecAnzque.' In Elul's Grst 
book on technique, published as Z,z TlscAnzqwg in France, but as The Technological
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Societv in North America - yet should have been translated as The Technical Societv 
(Elul 1990: xi) — Elul himself deGnes technique as "the totality of methods raüonaly 
arived at and having absolute efGdency." In the introducGon of the same American 
ediGon, Robert K. Merton curiously offers another deGruGon: any complex of 
standardized means for ataining a predetermined result. Yet, the Ganslator's deGniGon is 
wrong, by EUul's own admiGon: "The term recAnzgug, as 1 use it, does not mean 
machines, technology, or tAtr or tAotprocaAzreT̂r oAommg on ewf' [emphasis added] 
(Elul 1950: iv). This is merely one instance of how easy it is to nusunderstand EGul, 
perhaps a result of his difGcult style and subGeGes lost in translaGon.
EUul's introductory deGruGon of technique is simple enough, but what he does 
not include are the several intriguing characteristics, efects, and future consequences of 
modem techruque. 1 say modem tedmique with purpose so as to again make a 
disGncGon; the techruque Elul describes in 1950 is very diferent Gem aU technique 
before the eighteenth century. Prior to the eighteenth century - the dawn of the technical 
applicaGon of science which characterizes the modem era (63) - technique had 6)ur 
UmitaGons that separated it Gom modem technique, namely, limited appUcaGon, limited 
technical means, limited area of efect, and limited control (i.e., Geedom of human 
choice) (64, 67,68,76).
Clearly, these UmitaGons require some explanaGon, yet Grst it bears meuGorung 
that EUul regards the mtnnrzc nature of modem technique to be the same as that of pre- 
technical society: techniques are techniques. It is the nature of the technical phenomenon 
that has changed, i.e., the characterisGcs of the relaGon between technical phenomenon 
and society (63). The new nature of technique is made known by looking at its efects on
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society, not at its intrinsic qnaliGes. EUnl uses the dramatic example of a mortar shel to 
make his point; any number of shels of the ŝ e caliber wiU produce the same results in 
the same environment. Yet if the environment were to change — for instance, exploding 
the shel in a crowd of people - the results would change; it would be a diferent 
phenomenon. "To assess this change, it is not the intrinsic character of the explosion 
which must be examined, but rather its relation to the environment" (63).
The Grst of these UmitaGons of'old' technique is that of narow or limited 
apphcaGon. What this means is that technique once played a secondary role in 
producGve and consumpGve acGons to pleasure. Elul argues that humans historicaly 
regarded work not as a virtue as it is today, but as punishment (65). The idea, Elul says, 
was to work only as much as absolutely necessary in order to survive, meaning 
producGon and consumpGon were minimized, and so their coresponding techniques 
were limited. As a result, humans did not consider technique (and by inclusion, 
technology) to be very important, or that their fate was bound up in it in any way.
The second limitaGon, closely related to the Grst, involves technical means. 
ApparenGy, there were few means of ataining a parGcular end, and because of the Grst 
characterisGc, virtualy no atempt to perfect the means that did exist (67). Humans 
tended to keep tools as long as they were efecGve, and any deGciency was compensated 
by the skil of the worker. As a result, there was much vaiaGon between, say, carpenters 
according to each carpenter's abiGGes, and eforts were more directed m improving the 
skil of the worker rather than the tool itself Modem technique sought to reduce or even 
eliminate such variaGon of skil. The eventual improvement of tools came about in a 
more pragmaGc way, essenGaly the result of the pracGce of a personal art (68).
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The third limitaGon concerned geography. Technique spread slowly Gom 
civilizaGon to civilizaGon, and was hindered by factors within each civilizaGon such as 
climate, populaGon, Gora, poliGcal regime, etc.; a parGcular technique was an intrinsic 
part of a parGcular civilizaGon, and so transmission was very difGcult. The 'best way' to 
do something in one region wasn't necessarily the 'best way' to do it in another. As a 
result of techruque being integrated as such, it did not evolve autonomously, as Elul 
argues of modem technique (69).
The fourth limitaGon on technique before the eighteenth century related to 
control, or the existence of possibGity of choice. As a result of the charactensGcs 
discussed above, humans were Gee, EGul contends, to either accept a certain technique or 
get along without it. During the Roman EmpGe, for example, a man was more or less 
Gee to leave civilized life in the city for a life as a hermit in the countryside, and Roman 
law was powerless with regard to an individual's decision to evade military service or, 
surprisingly, imperial taxes and jurisdiction. Choice was a real possibility. With respect 
to material techniques, the possibility of an individual’s Geedom was even greater (76- 
77).
By isolating these characterisGcs of technique during pre-technical society, EUul 
aludes to characterisGcs of technique in a technical society; it is characterized by broad 
applicaGon into al spheres, resulting in a mulGplicaGon of means, the perfecGon of said 
means, and geogr̂hical extension to pracGcaly the entire globe. However, Elul 
isolates several other characterisGcs that serve to deGne modem technique more acutely: 
raGonality, arGGciality, automatism, self-augmentaGon, holism, universalism, and 
autonomy.
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Elul points out, declaring it "obvious," that present in modem technique is "a 
rational process which tends to bring mechanics to bear on al that is spontaneous and 
irational" (78) - as seen in examples of division of labour and the creation of standards. 
"Every intervention of technique is, in efect, a reduction of facts, forces, phenomena, 
means, and instruments to the schema of logic" (78).
ArGGciality is another "obvious" characterisGc of the modem technical 
phenomenon. EGul points out that the funcGonal means of technique, being artefacts, are 
arGGcial means, and the world being created by the accumulaGon of technical means is 
therefore an arGGcial world. Although it could be replied that this in an intrinsic 
characterisGc of technique, EUul would answer that modem technique destroys and 
subordinates the natural world, not even alowing a symbioGc relaGonship, which is 
exclusive to the modem technical phenomenon. To put it simply, technique is opposed to 
nature.
The other characterisGcs of modem technique Elul Usts, such as automaGsm, he 
claims are not quite so obvious as the two just menGoned. AutomaGsm of tectmical 
choice is summed up by the idea of "the one best way" to do a certain thing. This 
characterisGc has two aspects: one, when a technique is raGonaUy reGned to maximum 
efGciency, a person efecGvely has no other opGon, &)r he must decide in favour of that 
techruque. The efect of this extreme appUcaGon of raGonaUty is what Elul cals 
automatism, meaning that the technical process becomes self-determiGng, always 
moving toward to the most efGcient. "Man is stripped ofhis faculty of choice" (82). The 
second aspect of automatism of technical choice is seen in the relaGonship between 
technical and non-technical or spontaneous acGviGes. Elul argues that when these
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acGviGes colide, such as in poliGcs, technical acGvity automaGcaly and invariably 
ehminates the non-technical, but not with any direcGve wil or conscious efort. Using 
poliGcs as an example, Elul says that poliGcs was ful of uncertainGes resulting from 
qualiGes such as Gnesse, aptness, even genius. If chance is to be eliminated, poliGcs must 
become a technical acGvity. He cites Lenin as being the Grst to establish a poliGcal 
technique, farmulating rules and principles. As a result, even a mediocre poliGcian could 
atain a good average policy, ensuring stabGity and a consistent poliGcal line. The 
quesGon of what is the limit of automaGsGc techruque is raised, and Elul wonders if there 
is any at al (83).
The next obscure characterisGc of modem technique concerns self-augmentaGon, 
again having two aspects. The Grst aspect is that technique now progresses almost 
entirely without human intervenGon. CertaiGy it must be that technique indeed 
progresses by means of minute improvements by humans, but the role of human 
invention has been seriously reduced. Elul sees this characteristic in efects such as the 
disappearance of the one big genius, hke Newton, who sets in moGon a new way of 
thinking. Rather, invenGon and innovaGon occur on an anonymous level, where there is 
an army of technicians making constant adjustments and improvements to a given 
technique (86).
Realizing that he might be sounding self-contradictory, in that he asserts the self- 
augmenting nature of modem technique yet concedes to the direcGve role humans play in 
technical progression, EUul appeals to the second aspect of self-augmentaGon; automaGc 
growth. EUul argues that modem technique grows automaGcaUy, referring even to the 
growth in number of those technicians who supposedly control the progression of a given
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technique; Elul refers to a staGsGc that says the number of scientists and technicians has 
doubled every decade for a century (87). The thrust here is that the nature of technique 
demands that more and more technicians are present to make continuous modiGcations 
and improvements, eSecGvely in response to technique's demand to grow.
. Self-augmentaGon, Elul continues, can be formulated in two laws: one, that 
technical progress is ireversible; and two, that it grows geometricaly. As for 
ireversibUity, Elul states that every invenGon cals forth other technical invenGons in 
other domains (89). There is never any aGempt to halt the process, let alone reverse it. 
Geometric pmgression occurs because of the result of ireversibihty; since every 
invenGon cals forth other invenGons, those invenGons in turn do the same. Part of the 
reason for technique's self-augmentation is that technique creates problems that only 
technique can solve. During this augmentaGon, Elul contends, humans play no real part 
at al; technique is involved in a new kind of spontaneous acGon and the evoluGon of 
technique becomes exclusively causal, "losing al Gnality" (93).
The next characteristic exclusive to modem technique is what Elul cals holism 
(the translaGon uses 'monism,' yet the French is unzczté, and so 'hoGsm' may be a beter 
choice). This means that as the technical phenomenon embraces al the separate 
techniques in the process of self-augmentaGon, it forms a whole. "It is useless to look for 
diferenGaGons," EGul asserts. "They do exist, but only secondarily" (94). Certainly, 
material techniques such as computers are diferent Gom others, like cars. The same 
fbUows for immaterial techniques, such as the construcGon of a building and a teaching 
method. Yet they al share idenGcal features. "This idenGty is the primary mark of that
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thoroûgoing unity which makes the technical phenomenon a single essence despite the 
extreme diversity of its appearances" (95).
The nniversalistic characteristic of the technical phenomenon unfolds 
geographicaly. The geographic aspect of technical universalism is the constant spread of 
technique, country by country, until it is truly universal. Technique has and does spread 
- mainly by commerce or war (much like Coca-Cola), presupposed by transportation and 
communication techniques - into hands where, unlike old technique that could only be 
accepted by a similar civilization, technique imposes itself (EUul 1950: 118). This 
expansion also (as usual) includes technicians.
The last menGoned characterisGc of modem technique is that of autonomy. EUul 
isolates this characteristic as the primary and essential condition for the development of 
technique. What this means is that technique is a closed system where maters of use and 
ends are outside its design. Technique asserts its autonomy in al spheres - politics, 
economics, morality, spirituality - with the excepGons of physical and biological laws. 
These, however, it dominates and puts to work (134). Technique requires predictabiUty, 
and so it must "prevail" over the human being, reducing it to "the king of the slaves of 
technique" (138). This opinion is shared by Heidegger.
Already some eGects of the modem technical phenomenon have been seen, 
namely that it seeks to overcome anything that is unpredictable and spontaneous, i.e., 
humans and nature. The inevitable result of such dominaGon of technique over evay 
aspect of existence is that everything necessarily serves it (128). Everything is subject to 
it, Gom procreaGon to how we eat, grow, where we Uve, how we die. How one 
approaches these efects is a mater of personal posiGon; the characterisGcs EUul
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describes can be viewed either posiGvely or negatively. For instance, Walter Ong is 
optimistic with regards to the arGGciality of technique and its intemalizaGon: 
"Technologies are arGGcial, but. .arGGciality is natural to human beings. Technology, 
properly interiorized, does not degrade human life but on the contrary enhances it" (Ong 
1988: 82-83). Elul clearly takes the negaGve view: "Today the sharp knife of 
specializaGon has passed like a razor into the living Gesh. It has cut the umbihcal cord 
which linked men with each other and with nature" (Elul 1950: 132). Again, Martin 
Heidegger would agree with this dark expression, but he sees hope in technology as wel.
2.2: Martin Heidegger
Martin Heidegger is considered by many to be one of̂ if not the, most important 
and inGuenGal philosophers of the 20"̂ century. MoGvated by Husserl's cal to bring 
philosophy down "to the things themselves," Heidegger developed what became known 
as phenomenological existenGahsm, inGuencmg generaGons of philosophers, most 
notably Jean-Paul Sartre, Herbert Marcuse and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.
Heideggo: was bom in the town of Messkirch, in the Black Forest of Baden, on 
September 22, 1889. He studied Roman Catholic theology and then philosophy at the 
University of Freiburg where he was a student of Husserl. Heidegger began teaching at 
Freiburg in 1915. While teaching at Marburg, Heidegger wrote and published his hugely 
inGuenGal and original opus,  unzf Zezt (Beine and Timei in 1927. A year later, he 
became a professor of phGosophy at Freiburg, succeeding his old mentor. After 1930, 
Heideggô's work Gxmsed primarily on Westem concepGons of Being, parGcularly 
contrasting the reverent HelenisGc concepGons with those found in modem industrial
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society. AAer a Gnitful academic career, despite the lamentable reputation of an early 
association with the Nazi party, he died in Freiburg on May 26,1976 (KauGnann 1980: iv 
& 11).
In 1954 he published "The QuesGon Concerning Technology," in which he 
woiked around the problem of modem technology and its essence. In a powerGil and 
now Amous passage at the beginning of the essay, he presents the problem:
Everywhere we remain unGee and chained to technology, whether 
we passionately afBrm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it 
in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral;
G)r this concepGon of it, to which today we parGcularly hke to do 
homage, makes us uterly blind to the essence of technology.
(Heidegger 1954:287-288)
Yet the essence of technology, Heidegger asserts, is not at al technological or 
equivalent to technology in any way: "When we are seeking the essence of "tree," we 
have to become aware that what pervades every Gee, as Gee, is not itself a Gee that can be 
encountered among al other Gees" (287). Indeed, Heidegger concedes that the common 
view of technology as means to ends and as human acGvity - as instrument - could not 
be anything but corect (288). What is more, this deGniGon is apphcable to every kind of 
technology, primiGve as wel as modem, and in being so condiGons our every atempt to 
master it. "Everything depends on our manipulating technology in the proper manner as 
a means" (289). But what if technology were no mere means? How would it stand with 
the wil to master it?
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So while Heidegger admits that the instrumental deGniGon of technology is 
indeed corect, it is not completely 'true'. What Heidegger means is that a merely corect 
understanding of technology does not go deep enough to reveal its essence; the corect 
understanding of technology Gxes upon the surface value of technology, that being its 
neutral instrumentality, and stops there. By conGast, the true understanding of the 
essence of technology can be revealed through a proper understanding of its 
instrumentality (259).
A proper understanding of technology's instrumentality, Heidegger argues, 
begins with AristoGe and his concept of causality, a concept we have inherited and 
understand to be the principles by which technology operates. Unfortunately, philosophy 
has maintained a skewed interpretaGon of AristoGe's causal concept, and so has 
consequenGy bared a proper understanding of technology's operaGonal principles (290).
In Physics and Metaphysics. Aristotle describes what he sees as the four ‘causes’ 
of a thing, the four explanaGons or characterisGcs that make a thing what it is. These 
include: the material cause (hyle), or the mater from which a thing is made; the formal 
cause (ezzJof), or the form into which the maGer enters or is shaped; the efGcient cause 
(/ogos), or that which brings about or makes the thing; and the Gnal cause (re/os), or the 
end to which the thing is directed. Since AristoGe's exposiGon of these principles, our 
understanding of what a technology is has been determined, and perhaps limited, by our 
interpretaGon of AristoGe's causality. But Heidegger suggests that since our 
understanding of'cause' is Aulty, so too is our understanding of technology.
What we understand as "cause," or couju in Latin, belongs to the verb caz/ere, to 
fal, or that which brings it about so that something turns out as an efect. Heidegger
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argues that what the Romans caled causa is caled azriom in Greek, and means something 
subtly but signiGcantly diferent; azrioM is that thing to which something else is indebted. 
The reciprocal side of indebtedness is 'being responsible for', which is azria in Greek, 
again from the afrzon root. Indebtedness and responsibility certainly suggest a kind of 
cause and efect relationship between two things, but is not exactly the same as the kind 
of relationship suggested by cazzsa — the relationship is more fluid and intimate than 
being detached and mechanical as caztya suggests. The relationship between the fr)ur 
causes, then, is obviously diferent than what we have understood so far.
Heidegger suggests that the relationship between the four causes of a thing, as 
Aristotle in the original Greek intended, inter-relate in this way: the final object is 
indebted to both the mater {hyle) from which it is made, and the aspect (eidos) in which 
it is shaped. Above these two lies a third cause that is responsible for the object, and that 
is 'that which gives bounds' or completes the meaning of what the object was made to be 
(re/os). Tlg/os has often been misinterpreted to mean simply "end" or "purpose," but is 
more precisely defrned as that which "is responsible for what as mater and what as 
aspect are together co-responsible for the [frnal object]" (291). Heidegger's example is 
that of a silver chalice, which is indebted to the silver for its mater and to the aspect of 
chalice-ness for its form. Both the silver and the chalice-ness are in turn indebted to the 
fg/os, or that which confrnes the chalice within the realm of consecration and bestowal, 
for combining the mater and aspect together into one object and circumsoibing it as a 
sacrifrcial vessel.
The fourth participant or "mode of occasioning" is the efGcient cause, but here 
Heidegger contends that the Aristotelian doctrine neither knows the cause that is named
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by this tenu, nor uses a Greek word that would corespond to it. Our common 
understanding of the eficient cause is limited with respect to the responsibility involved 
in the process; in the example of the chalice the efGcient cause would be the silversmith, 
but the silversmith's relationship and responsibility is much more than merely crafGng 
the object. Rather, the silversmith "brings forward into appearance" the chalice through 
"careful consideraGon"; the diference is one of manufacturing and direcGon of resources. 
The careful consideraGon and acGvity of bringing forth (poz&yzs) of the silversmith is the 
applicaGon of logos. The three previous causes are indebted to the silversmith for "the 
"that" and the "how" of their coming into ̂pearance and into play for the producGon of 
the chaGce" (292). Bringing forth is a way of revealing, which in Greek is u/etAem; the 
Romans translate o/gtAezo as vgrifos, which we say in English as "unrevealing," or 
"truth."
The imphcaGon of this reinterpietaGon of Aristotle is that our approach to 
technology is not as intimate and even spiritual as it should be. Heidegger would say that 
we approach resources, technologies and the manufacturing process at face value, not 
properly through /ogos. If we were to carefuly consider a thing in order to properly 
reveal it, alowing it to "come out of concealment into unconcealment," as Heidegger 
would say, we would be truthfuly representing the thing itself To wit, "the possibility of 
al producGve manufacturing Hes in revealing" (294).
Technology, via this reinterpretaGon, is no mere means but rather a method of 
revealing, or pozasü. As stated in the inGoducGon, pozgaü is bound up in the original 
meaning of tgcA/zg, and so technology is thus properly understood to be inherenGy more 
considerate than instrumentalism suggests. "Technology is a mode of revealing.
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Technology comes to presence in the realm where revealing and imconcealment take 
place, where a/gfAem, truth, happens" (295).
In this sense, modem technology is no different than older or primiGve 
technologies. The essence of technology is historicaly consistent, in that any stage of 
technological development is a way of revealing. However, when one examines modem 
technology closely, it becomes apparent that the kind of revealing modem technology 
does is not ofpoz&yzs, but is more aggressive. "The revealing that rules in modem 
technology is a chalenging , which puts to nature the unreasonable
demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such" (Heidegger 
1954: 296). For example, agriculture was once the work of a peasant who, in sowing 
seed, was operating within the natural forces of growth and increase. Modem 
technology's relaGonship to the environment exposes a diferent character 
Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. Air is now set 
upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium, 
for example; uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy, which can 
be released either for destmcGon or for peaceful use. (296).
Nature is now "set upon" by technology, chalenged to provide resources rather than 
relating more or less equaly with technology.
Heidegger demonstrates this new relaGonship with yet another example; the 
Rhine, once considered to be a great river Gled with historical signiGcance and grandeur, 
is now chalenged to provide hydro-electric energy, apparenGy as something at our 
command. Technology is not incorporated into the great river as was the old model, but 
now is dammed up and viewed as a power supplier — much like the Narmada example
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menGoned in Gie inGoducGon. Even when not viewed as resource but as a nver in the 
landscape, it is done so as an object "on cal for inspecGon by a tour group ordered there 
by the vacaGon industry" (297) Modem technology, in chalenging, ordering, regulating 
and securing nature reveals it to be but standing-reserve, something at hand to be 
maiGpulated and exploited.
To this Heidegger adds that technology is equaly chalenged as a resource. 
Objects like airliners are standing-reserve, ordered to insure the possibility of 
transportaGon. In this way, instrumental technologies are not autonomous and so are not 
themselves doing the chalenging of nature; rather, people are chalenging technology, 
driving it forward. However, what sounds like having a handle on technology is 
misleading; rather, people are already chalenged themselves, belonging “more 
originaly" than Nature within the standing-reserve (299). This means that humans alow 
themselves to be chalenged by wilingly taking part of the technological process in 
ordering nature, in ̂proaching nature as an object of research and exploiting its 
energies, as a result of inauthenGc being:
Thus when man, invesGgating, observing, pursues nature as an area 
ofhis own conceiving, he has already been claimed by a way of 
revealing that chalenges him to approach nature as an object of 
research, until even the object disappears into the otjecGessness of 
standing-reserve. (300)
Modem technology, then, is no mere human achievement.
The essence of technology, as that which "gathers" or "sends" people to order al 
things as standing-reserve, Heidegger cals "enframing," or G&rte/ in German.
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Heidegger chooses GarW/ because for him it encompasses the radicaly dualistic nature 
of the essence of technology, namely chalenging and producing or presenting (pozesw); 
the word steZ/en means "to set upon," yet also suggests Ae/Zen, which implies 
"producing" or "presenting." This essence is the driving force behind al mathemaGcs, 
physics, and thus the modem scienGGc world-view, and so modem technology is merely 
its most recent, and dangerous, product (ca. 1954). More so, the essence of technology is 
humaiGty's supreme danger (308).
This danger comes about when humanity no longer concerns itself with proper 
poeGc manner of producing and acting, or appealing to Zogoj. When Guth is no longer 
the chief concern ofhumanity, but instead merely corectness, then the chalenging nature 
of the essence of technology blocks poZarir. In other words, when we focus merely on 
the face value of objects we are thrust into a rigorous and logical world-view, and we are 
subsequently blinded to poiesis, or the way in which we can reveal truth (give Being a 
home).̂ When this happens, the truths and essences of everything are no longer available 
to us, and the possibility of knowledge is lost. Most importantly, the possibility of 
knowledge of humanity's essence is at stake: "The rule of enframing threatens man with 
the possibility that it could be denied him to enter into a more original revealing and 
hence to experiaice the cal of a more primal truth" (309).
Yet al is not lost. Hope rests in what Heidegger idenGGes as a "saving power" 
within the essence of technology. If my understanding is corect, Heidegger is making 
reference to his claim that the essence of technology is dualisGc, comprised of two 
radicaly opposed ways of revealing: chalenging andpozggZs. These two ways of 
revealing wiU never be separated or disappear - certainly, the chalenging aspect wil
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assert itself yet poz&yis wil always remain as a part of the essence of technology. The 
trick is to keep the danger of the essence of technology always in sight. This is the task 
ofpoZ&ïK, or art. Art is the saving power within the essence of technology:
Because the essence of technology is nothing technological, 
essenGal refrecGon upon technology and decisive confrontaGon 
with it must happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the 
essence of technology and, on the other, fundamentaly diferent 
from it. (317)
Heidegger's comments here are extraordinary and deeply insightful. Like Elul, 
he is asserting the totalizing efect of the essence of technology, parGcularly the 
"chalenging" of technology which is perhaps singularly responsible for the context in 
which Heidegger is writing. It is also this "chalenging" aspect which characterizes 
modem technology, separating it historicaly from al previous incamaGons or forms of 
technology. That art has claim to this same essence - as poZ&Mj, as the brother and 
opponent of "chalenging" - by virtue of its roots in techne makes a good deal of sense, 
especialy when considered in the context of digital technologies; not only do 
technologies and arts share the same essence and so are equaly approachable, 
developments in digital technologies has made available new and more powerful kinds of 
art.
Don Ihde, Distinguished Professor at State University of New York at Stony 
Brook, responds to Heidegger's asserGon of an essence in technology. In the essay 
"Technology and Cultural Variants" (1985), Ihde argues that Heidegger's posiGon is 
ambiguous about the kind technology of which he is describing the essence, whether it is
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Westem technology as a historical phenomenon, or modem technology only, or the 
whole ofWestem society. In response to this ambiguity, Ihde ofers an implicit critique 
of Heidegger by applying Husserl's claim that the way to establish an essence or 
invariant is through the examinaGon ofvariaGons; Ihde argues that Heidegger does not 
give an adequate account of variants to establish the existence of an essence of 
technology (Ihde 1985: 20). For his defense, Ihde refers to cultural variaGons of 
technology that do not adhere to Heidegger's descripGon of an autonomous and thus 
socialy determinisGc technology. One such example is that ofMicronesian navigaGonal 
tools. In this instance, the tool is modeled after the cultural percepGon that the island 
being sought moves toward the navigator and that the water moves past the boat as the 
ocean moves in relaGon to the boat, rather than the Westem percepGon that the boat and 
navigator move through the water to the staGonary island. The tool developed to aid the 
navigator within this percepGon, combined with the subGe art of wave reading, provides a 
su&cient means ofnavigaGon among the Micronesian islands. When compasses were 
inGoduced into this culture, the ef&ct of its reliability in storms and constant visibility 
was a decline in wave reading (24).
Ihde suggests that such cultural variaGons in technology serve to prove four 
things: Grst, that technologies corelate with cultural ouGooks; second, that technologies 
"incline" when embedded in cultures, meaning that introduced technologies serve to 
over-ride other technologies and thus alter a culture; third, that any single technology can 
be used in ways not intended; and GrurGr, that there are stages in the ad̂taGon and use of 
technologies as they are learned and made famihar. For example, as a culture becomes 
familiar with a parGcular technology, they move out of a fear/fascinaGon stage into Ones
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of increasing com&rt and, perhaps, indiference (32). In al of these "proofs," Idhe sees a 
critical response to Heidegger's description of an essence of technology.
The Grst comment I must make in response to Ihde — and in defence of Heidegger 
- is that Heidegger is perfectly clear about the kind of technology whose essence he is 
describing. It is that of modem industrial technology, not technology at any stage in 
history, nor the whole of Western society -Aar he obviously considers technology and 
society to be separate "things" if one can have an efect on the otAer. Heidegger never 
hinted at making a '\vhole earth measurement", as Ihde would put it, h)r his examples are 
merely of modem Westem - particularly German - technologies.
Secondly, Heidegger does in fact use Husserl's method of proving an essence 
through examples of variations. Working within the Westem tradition, Heidegger 
provides a series of examples ranging hom silver-smithing to farms, windmils, sawmils, 
mines, hydro-electric generators, and aircraft (Heidegger 1954:290-297). Technology's 
essence is sought through the historical variations of technology in the Westem tradition. 
What needs to be restated here is that Heidegger was describing an essence of technology 
that is historicaly consistent, even ahistoical. The essence of technology only becomes 
a problem when misunderstood and its chalenging character is "alowed" to become 
predominant in a culture, as with modem industrial technology. Westem technology has 
not always been a problem, just as Micronesia's navigational technology does not pose a 
problem within Micronesian culture.
Consequently, I believe that Ihde's four proo6 do not address Heidegger's notion 
of an essence of technology. What is worth mentioning here, diougb, is the similarity of 
Idhe's description of technology to Elul's, particularly in proo6 two and three. In fact.
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Ihde seems to beproWmg Heidegger's claims about technology, in that its rational 
character and ability to reveal apwtrcw/ar "world" - a Westem world — wil undoubtedly 
afect the user, no mater the context
2J: Herbert Marcuse
It would be a gross understatement to say that Heidegger's thinking influenced 
many people. Heidegger amassed a devoted folowing, including many of the students 
who sat before his reputedly briliant lectures. One such student Herbert Marcuse, 
became wel known in his own rît for his views on technology and its social 
implications. Like Heidegger, Marcuse is critical of technology's dominant place in 
Westem culture, and likewise views instrumental technologies as the embodiments of a 
totalizing kind of rationality. This rationality shares many - perĥs uncanny - 
characteristics with Heidegger’s Gestel or “essence.” Yet unlike Heidegger’s analysis, 
Marcuse's analysis and solution are economicaly and politicaly motivated.
Marcuse was bom in 1898 into a prosperous Jewish-German merchant family in Berlin. 
After an uneventful service in the First World War, Marcuse earned a doctorate in 
literature hom the University of Freiburg. He worked for a while as a bookseler, but 
after reading Heidegger's ir/wf Zlgft after its publication in 1927, went back to 
Freiburg to study with Heidegger, working as his assistant. In 1933, Marcuse joined the 
fnstifur _/5r (Institute for Social Research) at the University of Frankfurt,
more commonly known as the Frankfurt School.
In 1934, Marcuse left Germany - and Heidegger. Heidegger had openly 
supported the Nazi party and praised Hitler to the point of "betraying philosophy," as
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Marcuse put it, in that Heidegger situated the wil of Hitler above any task of philosophy, 
and encouraged those around him, even his students, to do the same (Olafson, 1988, 98). 
Marcuse, a Jew and a philosopher and someone who had up until then considered himself 
a Heideggerian, found himself re-evaluating both his personal relationship with 
Heidegger as wel as his academic adoration of Heidegger's theories. Even though 
Heidegger withdrew hom any open association with the Nazi party after 1935, Marcuse 
felt that Heidegger's comments were in no way redeemed (01a6on 1988:100).
Marcuse eventualy ended up in New York City, working h)r the American 
government as wel as teaching at a number of American universities, including 
Columbia and Brandeis, until his retirement in 1976 hom the University of California at 
La Jola. He died during a trip to Germany on July 29,1979 (Kelner 1984: 25).
Marcuse's thinking was primarily political, charged with Marxism and later 
augmented by Freudianism. Although he tried to separate himself hom Heidegger as 
much as physicaly, ideologicaly, and theoreticaly possible, there is no doubt that 
Heidegger's influence on Marcuse was permanent. He was also exposed to prominent 
German theorists of the time such as Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno and Walter 
Benjamin. These men, along with Marcuse, composed part of what became known as the 
Frankfurt School.
Drawing 6om the critical exercises of Kant, hrom the dialectics of Hegel, Marx 
and Lukàcs, as wel as 6om Freud, Weber, Husserl and Heidegger, the Frankfurt School 
developed what is known as 'critical theory.' Critical theory demanded that every one­
sided doctrine be subjected to criticism, including its own foundational theories, such as 
Marxism; far instance, they argued that die emancipating proletarian revolution was not
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inevitable, and that thought or theory was more or less independent of social and 
economic forces. Yet they stil considered themselves Marxists; Marcuse himself 
explained that Marxist theory left itself open to such evolutions (Olafson 1988: 97).
The school in general believed that science and positivism were riddled with non- 
theoretical interests and that reason had become repressive; they could not accept without 
qualihcadon Max Weber's view that the sciences should be value-hee and thus avoid 
value-judgements about the people and institutions they study (Jay 1973: 83). They 
argued, for example, that science already embodied value-judgements, such as the 
desirability of the technological domination of nature, which, though in fact questionable, 
seemed so self-evident that these value-judgements appeared not to be as such at al, but 
simply a disinterested devotion to science. For science, the suggestion of value-neutrality 
efectively protected such wel-entrenched yet hidden value-judgements hom criticism 
(OCP: 355). But since theory and its concepts were a product of social processes, the 
Frankfurt School felt that critical theory must trace its origins and not, like empiricism 
and positivism, accept them and thereby indirectly endorse the processes themselves.
In this section, 1 wil briefly review Marcuse's assessment of technology and its 
implications for both the individual and society, referring primarily to his 1941 essay, 
"Some Social Implications of Modem Technology" (hereafter SSIMT) and also his later 
and more aggressive work 6om 1964, One-Dimensional Man (hereafter ODM).
Marcuse, like Heidegger and Elul, asserts a crucial diference between modem industrial 
technology and previous forms, yet also maintains technology's historicaly consistent 
substantive element.
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Marcuse, like Heidegger, defines technology as something more than just 
machines; rather technology is deSned as "a social process, in which technics proper (that 
is, the technical ̂paratus of industry, transportation, communication) is but a partial 
factor" (Marcuse 1941:138). Additional dehnitions are as folows: a mode of 
production; the totality of instruments which characterize the machine age; a mode of 
organizing and perpetuating or changing social relationships; a manifestation of prevalent 
thought and behavior paterns; and an instrument for control and domination.
Technology for Marcuse is al of these things, the perverted embodiment of rationality 
and standards of individualism bom of Enlightenment thinking.
Machines themselves are politicaly neutral; they can promote authoritarianism as 
wel as liberty, abundance as wel as scarcity. National Socialism was, for Marcuse, the 
most striking example of how a "highly rationalized and mechanized economy with the 
utmost efhciency in production can operate in the interest of totalitarian oppression and 
continued scarcity" (139). Even now within modem democratic industrial society, there 
is an element of totalitarian control, though subtle, which exists due to the influence of 
technology and its implicit rationality. Y et the curent brand of modem industrial 
rationalism difers greatly hom the kind of rationalism hom which it was derived, and 
Marcuse sees key diferences and even oppositions between traditional rationalism and 
the modem brand of rationality and individualism.
According to Marcuse, the earlier or traditional rationality was marked or even 
guided by the principle of individualism, in that it was said that self-interest was rational 
and that no extemal authority had the right to encroach upon the individual; the 
individual, as a rational being, ought to be hee to make rational actions. Indeed, by being
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free to think for themselves, people were assumed to be capable of making rational or 
"best" decisions, which would in turn contribute to a just and civil society. Furthermore, 
in the economic seting of the time, a person's mark of individualism was made by the 
products that he created and sold as a part of the community's needs.
. Yet as the industrial age and a freer enterprise economy emerged and evolved, it 
arived at the point where, Marcuse says, "the process of commodity production 
undermined the economic basis on which the individualistic rationality was built" (141). 
As a result such conditions, particularly work environments such as mass production 
assembly lines, the principles of individualistic rationality were surendered to the 
manufacturing process and an economic system that favoured effciency and 
mechanization. What's more, the prof table use of such means of production dictates - to 
an extent - what kind and how much of commodifes are to be produced, and "through 
this mode of producf on and distribufon, the technological power of the apparatus afects 
the entire rafonality of those whom it serves." In short, as technical rad onality spread 
through the economic and political systems, the individual as it was once understood had 
become lost in the apparatus.
To be clear, Marcuse writes that individuality has not entirely disappeared; rather, 
"the fee economic subject has developed into the object of large-scale organizaf on and 
coordinafon, and individual achievement has been transformed into standardized 
effciency" (142). This transfbrmafon is nothing like the Enlightenment ideal, but nearly 
its opposite: "The effdent individual is the one whose performance is an acfon only 
insofar as it is the proper reacfon to the objecfve requiremaits of the apparatus, and his
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liberty is confined to the selection of the most adequate means for reaching a goal which 
he did not set" (142).
The individual, at one time the purpose and triumph of Enlightenment rationality, 
had been absorbed into the apparatus, the now clichéd 'cog in the machine'. As a result 
of the individual becoming a part of the system, he was efectively robbed of the ability - 
or even motive - to criticaly engage the system itself This new kind of rationality - a 
technological rationality - established new standards of judgment and created atitudes 
that caused people to accept the dictates of the new rational system. As a result, 
technological rationality is characterized by its stifling efect on critical thoût. People, 
and by extension society, had become "one-dimensional. "
Marcuse provides an example of this stifling efect of technological rationalism 
on critical thought Marcuse refers to a person who drives through the mountains to 
distant place, a situation I happened to mimic while out West last spring. Like Marcuse's 
traveler, I used the highway map to choose the route to my destination, upon which 
towns, lakes, and mountains appeared merely as obstacles to my destination. There were 
signs al along the route with instructions, including when to stop and take note of a 
certain vista or a historical landmark. Even the parking spaces at these places were 
designed to offer the best view. Al of my thinking had been done 6)r me already. "He 
wil fare best who folows its directions," Marcuse writes, "subordinating his spontaneity 
to the anonymous wisdom which ordered everything for him" (143). Indeed, my trip was 
a good one, hee of complications — or adventure for that mater.
The diference, then, between traditional rationalism and modem technological 
rationalism is that rationality, having once been a critical force, is now one of
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compliance. The overal social implication of this shift is that as "the laws of 
technological rationality spread over the whole society, they develop a set of truth values 
of their own which hold good for the proper functioning of the apparatus - and for that 
alone" (146). In other words, Marcuse identiGes a new compliant atütude in modernity 
that apparendy did not exist in the past, i.e., not unGl the mid to late 1700s. Of course, it 
could be argued that history does not give us such an example. With the possible 
excepGon of elites, people have never been Gee in the senses that Marcuse employs. In 
Marcuse's defence, however, the modem situaGon presents unique problems which he 
has vividly and I think corecGy isolated.
This new atGtude, which Marcuse cals 'compliant efGciency', perfecGy 
ilustrates for Marcuse the structure of technological rationality:
Autonomy of reason loses its meaning in the same measure as the 
thoughts, feelings and actions of men are shaped by the technical 
requirements of the apparatus which they have themselves created.
Reason has found its resting place in the system of standardized 
control, producGon and consumpGon. There it reigns through the 
laws and mechanisms which insure the efGciency, expediency and 
coherence of this system." (146)
The result of compliant efGciency is that the pursuit of self-interest is 
"condiGoned upon heteronomy, and autonomy is seen as an obstacle rather than stimulus 
for raGonal acGon" (147). What's more, Marcuse sees here a curious split of reason, of 
what was once, within the scope of tradiGonal raGonality, a homogeneous truth: "one 
assimilated to the apparatus, the other became (remained?) antagonisGc to it; the one
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making up the prevailing technological rationality and governing the behavior required 
by it, the other pertaining to a criGcal raGonality whose values can be fulGled only if it 
has itself shaped al personal and social relaGonships" (147). Yet this division of truth 
values operates and is interpreted under a single ideology of technological raGonality, so 
that even though criGcal proposiGons are argued, e.g., that every individual is equipped 
with certain inalienable rights, they are GequenGy interpreted in favour of efGciency and 
concentraGon of power (147).
Thought, even criGcal thought, within a technologicaly raGonal system becomes 
standardized so that criGcal truth values are (mis)appropriated and consequently 
represented as truth values of the very systems that the criGcal proposiGon iniGaUy 
atacked. This reversal has a stulGfying efect on the potency of criGcal thought within 
the established culture. This familiarity with the truth iluminates the extent to which 
society has become indiSerent and insusceptible to the impact of criGcal thought. As 
Marcuse puts it, "for the categories of criGcal thought preserve their truth value only if 
they direct the ful realizaGon of the social potenGaliGes which they envision, and they 
lose their vigor if they determine an atGtude of fatalisGc compliance or compeGGve 
assinulaGon" (148). In Canada, this kind of reversal of truth values was seen in the 
adopGon of leA-wing social programs, such as health-care and welGire, into tradiGonaly 
right-wing platforms during the 1960s, 1970s, and cuhninaGng in the enhenchment of the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the ConsGtuGon in 1982 (Jackson & Jackson 1998:
169,171).
In Europe in parGcular, this tendency of criGcal raGonality to be assimilated into 
the organizaGonal and psychological patern of the apparatus caused a change in the very
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structure of the social opposiGon. "The criGcal truth values home by an opposiGonal 
social movement," Marcuse writes, "change their signiGcance when this movement 
incorporates itself into the apparatus. Ideas such as liberty, producGve industry, planned 
economy, saGsGicGon of needs are then Gised with the interests of control and 
compeGGon. Tangible organizaGonal success thus outweighs the exigencies of cnGcal 
raGonality" (149). For example, the condiGons of mass commodity producGon 
eventualy compeled people to organize opposiGonal groups to represent common 
interests, yet these crowds or mass groups - forming within a technologicaly raGonal 
environment - inevitably became mass parGes and their leadership transformed into mass 
bureaucracies. Yet “this transformation, far from dissolving the structure of 
individualisGc society into a new system, sustained and sGengthened its basic tendencies" 
(150). The extent to which ideology, mass culture, and consumerism would integrate the 
working class into capitalist society was not quite what Marx had anticipated.
The crowd or mass is not new or unique to the modem era, yet there are peculiar 
characteristics of the mass within the technologicaly raGonal system. In the past, i.e., 
within a tradiGonaly raGonal system, the realizaGon of individuality contributed to the 
development of community, wherein each member contributed so as to exist in a more or 
less symbioGc manner. In Marcuse's analysis of modem capitalisGc society, the crowd 
represents the anG-thesis of community. The crowd is now merely an associaGon of 
individuals who have been stripped of al 'natural' and personal disGncGons and reduced 
to, as Marcuse puts it, "the standardized subject of brute self-preservaGon" (150). While 
the crowd does indeed unite, it unites atomic subjects of self-preservaGon who are 
detached from everything beyond their selGsh interests and impulses. As the opposite of
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community, the crowd is the perverted realization of individuality. Masses within a 
technologicaly raGonal system consequenGy act as a conservaGve force that perpetuates 
the existence of the apparatus:
As there is a decrease in the number of those who have the freedom 
on individual performance, there is an increase in the number of 
those whose individuality is reduced to self-preservaGon by 
standardizaGon. They can pursue their self-interest only by 
developing 'dependable reacGon paGems' and by performing pre­
aranged funcGons (150-151)
As part of a mass, the uniformity among them is the compeGGve self-interest they al 
manifest. The members of the masses are individuals. Yet today, the prevailing type of 
individual is no longer capable of seizing the fateful moment which consGtutes his 
freedom. His funcGon has changed from a unit of resistance and autonomy to one of 
ductility and adjustment (151).
It is a nuance that defines the individual as both an autonomous figure and an 
impressionable conformist; yet the autonomy is false, and so both facets of the individual, 
if I understand Marcuse's analysis, ultimately support and contribute to the apparatus. In 
the end, "technological raGonalizaGon has created a common framework of experience 
for the various professions and occupaGons. Underneath the complicated web of 
straGGed control is an aray of more or less standardized techniques, tending to one 
general paGem, which insure the material reproducGon of society" (153). By this 
assessment, any acGon taken by a group or an individual is always already technicaly
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suited to the perpetuation of "apparatus" or the system and its values. From this 
standpoint, it may seem as though there is no ground for opposiGon.
In this parGcular essay, however, Marcuse offers a soluGon to what may have 
seemed by his descripGon to be an ireversible and uncontrolable situaGon. Marcuse 
idenGGes one aspect that both tradiGonal (or criGcal) raGonalism and modem 
technological raGonalism share: "it envisions the raGonal form of human associaGon as 
brought about and sustained by the autonomous decision and acGon of Gee men" (152).
In other words, people sGl have the capability of choice. In technologicaly raGonal 
systems, the same forces that created the modem masses as the standardized aGendants 
and dependents of large-scale industry also created the hierarchical organizaGon of 
private bureaucracies ( 154).
Marcuse argues that in democraGc countries, the growth of the private 
bureaucracy can be balanced by the sGengthening of the public bureaucracy, or a 
properly funcGoning democraGc system: "In the age of mass society, the power of the 
public bureaucracy can be the weapon which protects the people from the encroachment 
of special interests upon the general welfare. As long as the wil of the people can 
efecGvely assert itself the public bureaucracy can be a lever of democraGzaGon" (155). 
By Marcuse's analysis, the raGonality inherent in the specializaGon of funcGons tends to 
enlarge the scope and weight of bureaucracies, which, for a Marxist, isn't necessarily a 
bad thing.
This soluGon, he is clear to point out, does not necessarily lead to a kind of 
socialist colecGvism. Marcuse argues that technological progress does not alow for the 
kind of colecGvism that replaces the Gee pursuit of competing individuals with the
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general social applicaGon of the traditional properties of the individual; rather, Marcuse 
asserts that men wil always compete for a share of social wealth, that men wil continue 
to regard society as a power of restraint and control, that they may furnish a false 
colectivism that maintains the dominahon of humans over nature and of humans over 
humans (160). However, Marcuse makes the clear - and Heideggerian - suggestion that 
technology, though being a dominating force and influence, has within it the possibility 
for a new kind of human (i.e., individual) development. As he puts it, "mechanization 
and standardization may one day help to shift the center of gravity Gom the necessihes of 
material production to the arena of Gee human realization. The less individuality that is 
required to assert itself in standardized social performances, the more it could reGeat to a 
Gee 'natural' ground" (160).
Eventualy, technological progress could make it possible to decrease the time 
and energy spent in the production of the necessihes of life, and a gradual reduction of 
scarcity and abolihoo of compeGGve pursuits could permit the self to develop Gom its 
natural roots. "The less Gme and energy a person has to expend in maintaining his life 
and that of society," Marcuse writes, "the greater the possibility that he can 
"individualize" the sphere ofhis human realizaGon" (161). In this conclusion, clearly, 
Marcuse echoes Marx's own utopian impulse, yet also employs a Heideggerian 
phenomenological existenGalism - a Marxist phenomenological existenGalism.
So, in summary, SSIMT is a sketch of the historical decline of individualism Gom 
the Gme of the bourgeois revoluGons to the rise of modem industrial society. The 
development of modem industry and technological raGonality undermined the basis of 
the individual raGonality and social apparatus. As capitalism and technology developed.
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advanced industrial society demanded increasing adjustment to the economic and social 
apparatus, and submission to increasingly total domination and administration. As a 
result, a mechanics of conformity spread throughout society. The efGciency and power 
of advanced industrial society overwhelmed the individual, who gradualy lost the earlier 
traits of critical raGonality, thus producing a 'one-dimensional society' and 'one­
dimensional man'.
In One Dimensional Man. Marcuse advances his criGque of modem industrial 
society as he laid it out in SSIMT some twenty years prior, presenting some parGcular 
social efects of modem consumerism or capitalist society, namely American society - 
though while Marcuse states that he is criGquing modem industrial society, it is clear that 
his focus is advanced capitalist society. The core ofhis criGque remains unchanged: the 
rise of a technological raGonality has perverted individualism and has efecGvely closed 
opposiGon to the prevailing system, or apparatus, and so people, unable to criGcaly 
engage the system, remain one-dimensional.
In ODM, Marcuse argues that vested interests, through technologies such as 
advertising media, impose false needs upon the public. False needs, for Marcuse, are 
artiGcial and heteronymous, as opposed to true needs, which are essenGal to human 
survival and weU-beiag. What is false are consumer needs like money, possessions, 
property and security, which are repressive to the extent that they perpetuate confarmity 
and alienated labour. They perpetuate a system whose continuaGon impedes the 
fulGUment of individual and social needs and potenGals.
Further to this, Marcuse argues that in advanced capitalist society, diferent 
personality structures than the ones described by Freud are needed. The father, for
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instance, is no longer a dominant economic Ggure, but is replaced at home by the 
authority of the mass media, school and sports teams, gangs and the like. The self 
immediately idenGGes with social ego-ideals and role-models, and no longer forges its 
idenGty through batling its id impulses and superego parent Ggures. The result is what 
Marcuse cals a one-dimensional staGc idaiGGcaGon with the others and with the 
administered reality principle. In other words, the individual's very graGGcaGons, 
thoughts, and behaviour are socialy administered.
Marcuse's assessment, as I've menGoned, is much stronger and more radical than 
in earlier works such as SSIMT, and so his soluGon is corespondingly more radical, 
suggesting that democraGc reform is not possible and that a radical social reconstrucGon 
is required. Marcuse argues that in order to employ technology in the interests of 
liberation, a radical break with curent science and technology is needed as wel as the 
development of a new science and technology (Marcuse 1964: 227).
Under capitalism, for instance, technology creates waste, planned obsolescence, 
superGuous luxury items and poisonous chemicals. Also, technology is used to create 
ever more efGcient instruments of social control and dominaGon. Since curent 
technology is inherenGy dominating and oppressive, breaking with the continuum of 
dominaGon would require a new technology of liberaGon, requiring new ends and goals 
for technology, and new kinds of technology, in what Marcuse cals "a turn Gom quanGty 
to quality" (231).
Jurgen Habermas, however, maintains that this idea of a new technology is 
logicaly Gawed for reasons that Marcuse himself has posed: the very logic of technology 
is that of instrumental raGonality, meaning that technology is rooted in the human
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organism and thus inherently folows the structure of labour. Technology cannot be 
fundamentaly altered (Habermas 1974: 81). In other words, if Marcuse argues that 
technology is inherently biased toward domination by virtue of its very design, how does 
he propose that technology could ever be used in the interests of liberation?
"The solution ofered in SSIMT is slightly diferent from the one he ofers in 
ODM. The diference in age between ODM, which is commonly taken as Marcuse's 
fuly developed analysis of modem industrial society, and SSIMT is some twenty years, 
and it should come as no surprise that there might be some inconsistencies between the 
two works. Some criGcs, such as Morton Schoolman, have felt that Marcuse's 
descripGon of technology in his earlier works, including SSIMT, contains two anomalous 
posiGons: one, the poliGcal neutrality of technique, and two, the progressive utilizaGon of 
techniques through democraGc reform (Arato 1998:138).
However, this interpretation of Marcuse is a focus of constant debate. As for 
Marcuse's asserGon of the poliGcal autonomy of technology, some criGcs, such as 
Douglas Kelner and Andrew Feenberg, reject the asserGon of others that Marcuse truly 
characterized technology as being so determirGsGc. They argue that the confusion 
appears far a number of reasons. One reason is that Marcuse was constanGy batling with 
and trying to rectify, at some level, essenGalism and historicism, idealism and 
materialism - a series of dualiGes which, Marcuse felt, have plagued tradiGonal and 
contemporary thought (Kelner 1984:234). For this reason, Marcuse's writing often 
appears to be self-contradictory. This apparent self<ontradicGon has led to 
interpretaGons pegging Marcuse to posiGons ranging Gom essenGalist to historicist, Gom 
dogmaGc Marxist to anG-Marxist, Gom bleak pessimist to stary-eyed utopian.
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Another reason for the confusion, which Feenberg picks up on, is due to 
Marcuse's rhetorical style. Marcuse's works - particularly those after 1950, i.e., Eros 
and Civilization and One-Dimensional Man - are marked by striking ̂horisms and 
grand, sweeping statements that, if read in isolation, are potentialy misleading (Feenberg 
1991: 72). As a result, Marcuse appears "insensihve to clinical and empirical detail just 
as he is too impressed with unprovable abstraction imported, perhaps too hastily, Gom 
Hegel, Marx, Freud, Adomo, and others" (DuGesne 2000: 109).
The other remark regarding the progressive utilizaGon of technology through 
democraGc reform fals again within the same debate. Kelner and Feenberg, again, 
defend Marcuse by saying that, for the same reasons as above, he has been misinterpreted 
and that his theory is in fact self-consistent. However, when taking the texts as they are 
writen, Marcuse is clearly maintaining an assessment of technological raGonality yet is 
ofkring two diferent soIuGons to the problem. Of course, once again, when one 
considers the Gme span between the two works in view, it should not come as a surprise 
that Marcuse would come to a diferent conclusion than the one he came to twenty years 
prior. What is consistent and most important, at least to the concerns of this thesis, is his 
assessment of technological raGonality.
Despite such minor inconsistencies, Marcuse's thinking 6t remarkably wel into 
the social milieu of the 1960s. His uncompromising criGque of advanced industrial 
society arGculated the anger and disgust felt by a generaGon of young people outraged by 
the Vietnam War, the oppression of blacks and other minoriGes, and the continued 
existence of poverty alongside the wealth of consumer society (Kelner 1984:241). Al 
of a sudden, Marcuse was vaulted Gom being a rclaGvely unknown German-American
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philosopher to a media celebrity and international hero of youth in revolt. It was 
"Marcusemania," and what the French caled "/a drugstorisahon (fg A/arcuf e" (DuGesne 
2000: 111).
2.4: Sdmmary of Modem Theory
Despite such disparate contexts, al three of these thinkers arive at the same 
crucial conclusions about modem technology and technical culture — that it is at once 
historicaly unique yet exudes an historicaly consistent substanGve element, whether it 
be caled /a tgcAn/gue, GerteZ/, or technological raGonality. Some important diferences 
exist, such as Marcuse's techno-utopianism in contrast to Elul's fatalisGc pessimism, yet 
the core assessments of substanGve technology among al of them are similar enough to 
provoke the recogniGon of an element of corectness at the very least. And despite the 
fact that al three thinkers were operating in a sense within similar geo-academic 
contexts, i.e., inGuenced by the same thinkers as weU as socio-poliGcal events like the 
Second World War by virtue of then geographical proximity, they were diferent enough 
that 1 believe such similar assessments are signiGcant.
The signiGcance of then similarity also extends to the present, where then 
accounts of the character of technology in relaGon to Westem society is only too clearly 
applicable to the curent seting of digital technology. In the next secGon, 1 wil survey a 
few accounts of curent technology and technique by contemporary theorists. In doing 
so, it wiG be made abundanGy clear that the present situaGon is not so diferent Gom the 
situaGon of Gfy years ago.
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3: Contemporary Theory
The assessments of modem theorists did not hold for long. Even by the time 
Marcuse was writing One Dimensional Man. radical developments in French Theory 
were already underway. Within mere decades, the world of theory had been rocked and 
turned bn its side. "Posf'-modem theory had emerged and was quickly undermining the 
foundations upon which modem theorists had laid their claims.
Nonetheless, some theorists did not throw out everything modem. Some, as we 
shal see, argue that modem theorists such as Heidegger and Marcuse stil have 
something valuable to contribute in the face of postmodernism. The character of 
technology in the Westem social system has indeed changed, as we wil see, but only as a 
result of a shiA Gom mechanical or industrial technologies to digital technologies. While 
this shiG is revolutionary in itself̂ the system in which the shiA has occured has not 
completed a similar revoluGon. Moreover, the substantive nature of technology has not 
witnessed an equaly fundamental change either.
3.1: The Postmodems
Broadly conceived, postmodernism shares its deepest roots with al of philosophy 
and Westem thougiht, yet Aie hints of its criAcal and ultimately deconstrucAve project 
appear in the romanAc philosophies of the mid- to late-19*̂ century, such as in the writing 
of Soren Kierkegaard, Karl Marx, and Friedrich Nietzsche (see Hacking 1998: 96) The 
phenomenological and existenAal projects ofHusseri, Heidegger, and Sartre as weU as 
the cultural criAques of the Frankfurt School set a Arm fbundarion G>r the thoughts and
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works of Guy Debord, Jacques Derida, Michel Foucault, Jean Baudrilaid, and many 
other prominent - and predominanAy French — theorists (Best & Kelner 1997: 39).
Postmodern theory is marked by revelations of reversal, and even more so a 
complete deconstrucAon — not destrucAon - of modem forms of thought, which were 
considered to be oppressive and blindly mechanisAc and dehumanizing. Postmodem 
theories, in an efort to debunk modemisms, are best understood not as 'after' 
modernism, but as subversive or even 'anA' modernism. Expressions of the "end" or 
"death" ofhistory, art, pohAcs, and even 'the real' reAect this opposite posiAon to the 
categories, boundaries and grand, unifying naraAves of modemisAc thinking.
In its most "extreme" and purest form, postmodernism is a state of mind, not a 
method that can be laid out and categorized (Bauman 1992: vi). To do so would be to 
apply modemisAc categorizaAon and ultimately miss the point, or as Derida put it, T am 
applied Derida" (Derrida 1995: interview).
But postmodernism persists as a project, and one of its most popular and 
inAuenAal representaAves is Jean Baudrilard. BaudriUard's most powerful ideas are 
contained in the words 'simulaAon' and 'hyperreality', words and ideas that originaAy 
were applied by him to the general Westem social condiAon yet resonate even more 
deeply in the curent digital age, which is also referred to in an iroiAcaAy modernist 
Gshion as the postmodem age. Baudrilard was oigaging primarily American popular 
culture and media, asserting that it has transformed Gom being a culture of spectacle to 
' one of simulaAon. The spectacle that has entranced us through media and popular culture 
has dissolved its boundaries, to the point where the images and signs of media spectacle 
have not merely replaced our reality, but have become it. We do not merely imitate the
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spectacle, but simulate it so thoroughly that our reality is always already simulation, our 
reality is hypereal, In short, the real does not exist:
It is no longer a quesAon of imitaAon, nor of reduplicaAon, nor 
even of parody. It is rather a quesAon of subsAtuting signs of the 
real for the real itself that is, an operaAonal double, a metastable, 
programmaAc, perfect descripAve machine which provides al the 
signs of the real and short-circuits al its vicissitudes. (Baudrilard 
1983:4)
And further:
The very deAniAon of the real becomes: that of which it is possible 
to give an equivalent reproducAon. This is contemporaneous with a 
science that postulates that process can be perfecAy reproduced in a 
set of given condiAons, and also with the industrial raAonality that 
postulates a universal system of equivalency (classical 
representaAon is not equivalence, it is transcripAon, interpretaAon, 
commentary). At Aie limit of this process of reproducibility, the 
real is not only what can be reproduced, but that which is always 
already reproduced. The hypereal. (146)
The death or replacement of the real causes an implosion of meaning (57), a 
concept he admitedly borows Aom the late Canadian media theorist Marshal McLuhan. 
In fact, BaudriUard declares that his own entire analysis comes back to McLuhan's 
formula: "The Medium is the Message," the "Arst great formula of this new age" (123 & 
54). However, McLuhan's concepAon of implosion is shghAy diferent than
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BaudriUard's in that McLnhan regarded "electric technology" as efectively reversing the 
3000 years of specializing and alienating efects - the explosion - of Gagmentary and 
mechanical technologies, and that the world has imploded in efect into a vilage - a 
global vilage (McLnhan 1964: 150). Baudrilard extends McLuhan's idea of implosion, 
as seen above, to mean the implosion of reality and meaning through electric or 
elecGonic technologies. As we now know, and as Albert Borgmann describes, electrical 
technologies seem to be even more explosive in McLuhan's sense than mechanical 
technologies had ever been. However, McLuhan's and BaudriUard's assertion that the 
medium is the message, that the medium itself structures and determines the message 
such that the two are indiscernible Gom each other, is compeUing. In this regard, 
BaudriUard's sense of implosion has weight.
3.2: Steven Best and Douglas Kelner
NaturaUy, there are those who disagree with BaudriUard, and with many other 
postmodem theorists. Steven Best of the University of Texas at El Paso and Douglas 
Kelner, the George F. Kneler PhUosophy of Education Chan at the University of 
CaUfbmia at Los Angeles, have writen a series of books efectively denouncing the 
claims of some postmodernists, particularly BaudrUlard, that we Uve in a postmodern age 
and that grand narative theory is useless. However, they do regard much postmodern 
theory as having more contemporary relevance and insight than modem theory, and so 
wish to strike a compromise between the two. In this regard, they combine the Marxist 
criAcal theory of the Frankfurt School, and Marcuse in parAcular, with the contemporary
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insights of postmodern theorists like Debord and Baudrilard. The result is what they cal 
"criAcal hermeneuAcs" (Best & Kelner 1997: 112).
Best and Kelner are wary of postmodern claims to a new era or paradigm that is 
drasAcaly different than modernism, evidenced partly by the misappropriaAon of 
postmodern concepts and even the very word "postmodern" in both popular culture and 
academic theory. Also, many writers have claimed to have 'nailed down' what 
postmodernism is exacAy, oAen with confusing and conAicAng results (20).̂ In contrast, 
Kelner and Best conclude that there is no one postmodern theory, but many complex and 
oAen conAicting postmodern theories. For this reason, it is important not to hasAIy react 
so that one either uncriAcaUy embraces postmodernism as if it were the key to the 
contemporary universe or totaly reject it as if it were a fad of no real significance (22).
As for BaudriUard, Best and Kelner quesAon his radical assessment of 
hypereality and subsequent implosion. While they find his insights to be important, they 
feel that "our present social situaAon is beter interpreted as an intensificaAon of 
(capitaUst) modernity rather than as a whoUy new "postmodemity"" (105). In Ught of 
this. Best and Kelner argue that since the currœt 'era' is thus a generalized extension of 
capitalism based on new technologies, capitalism and poUAcal economy, as wel as 
appUcable technologies, cannot be separated jfiom their efects on society (109).
Best and Kelner defer to Debord and SituaAonist Theory, which states that self- 
referenAality does not entaU hypereaUty:
Signs, images, and objects are not inscrutable and hermeAc simply 
because they no longer stand wiAAn a classical space of 
representaAon. It is not that one signifier brings us a "real" world
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and another doesn't but that one occludes a larger social context 
more than does another, that contextualizadon may be more 
dificult in one case than in another. However self-referential and 
abstract the signifiera, a critical hermeneutics can uncover their 
repressed or mystified social content and social relations. (112)
This means that critical hermeneutics is able to contextualize or deconstruct even 
BaudriUard's hypereaUty, which is itself ultimately an iUusion. Kelner and Best regard 
BaudrUlardian postmodern theory as obscuring the "continued existence of the capitaUst 
mode of production, of consumer society, of the culture industries, of the state, and of 
coercive violence in the repression and determination of social being." The result of 
postmodern theory’s obscuration is that it “conjoins with capitalism to obscure the most 
vicious and banal aspects of a violence no less real to those being "media-tized"" (114).
Critical hermeneutics has very simUar lines of thought to Frankfurt School-brand 
Critical Theory. KeUner, an expert ofMarcusean theory, admits as much. Kelner in 
particular takes an arguably more theoreticaly appropriate direction as an heir to 
Marcuse's project than other Marcuseans such as Andrew Feenberg, in that KeUner 
seems to be actively seeking to develop a supradisciplinary critical social theory. He 
feels that such a theory, a totalizing meta-theory, is precisely what is needed in response 
to the problems and potentials ofered by the totalizing efects of the present age, and in 
particular of digital technology. KeUner suggests that if Critical Theory wants to 
- continue to be relevant to the theoretical and poUtical concerns of today, it must address 
the issues advanced by the postmodern chaUenge to previous traditions of social theory. 
This means that critical social theory today must atempt to theorize the new social
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condiAons analyzed by ±e posAnodemists, and must demonstrate that its categories and 
theories continue to be applicable and iluminating in theorizing the new social 
condiAons:
Although we may be hving within a transiAonal space between the 
modem and the postmodern, and may be entering a terrain where 
old modes of thought and language are not always useful, it seems 
at this point in Ame that in many ways. New French Theory is itself 
Aawed and not of much use in helping us to understand and resolve 
many of the crucial theoreAcal and poliAcal problems that we 
curenAy face (i.e., moving beyond the curent age of conservaAve 
hegemony, learning to use and hve with new technologies in ways 
that wAl enhance human life, and understanding and dealing with a 
wide range of social problems from unemployment to AIDS).
(Kelner 2002: online)
33: Andrew Feenberg
There are others who share Marcuse's vision of a Marxist-based cultural criAque 
with an emphasis on technological raAonality. Andrew Feenberg, once a friend and 
student of Marcuse's and now a professor of Philosophy at San Diego State University, 
engages Marcuse's criAque of technological raAonality with a social construcAvist 
method to form what he cals, "criAcal theory of technology," taking the Marxist criAcal 
project in a diferent direcAon than Kelner and Best Feenberg argues that Marcuse does 
not give an adequate account of social transfbrmaAon, parAy as a result ofhis rhetorical
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style, and argues that technical systems are actualy &aût with internal tensions that 
threaten to weaken the whole, rather than being the unstoppable force Marcuse seems to 
make such systems out to be. Simply put, Feaiberg thinks that Marcuse is being too 
general in his account of technological rationality, and that a certain amount of diference 
needs fo be introduced.
Feenberg sees Marcuse describing the technologicaly rational society - modem 
industrial society - as something hke a gigantic machine regimenting its members, a 
society in which liberation depends on reversing the power between a repressive system 
and individual resistance. Feenberg's question to Marcuse is 'How is this possible?' 
Feenberg poses this question for two reasons: one, Marcuse does not offer a course of 
action; and two, the possibility of efecting such a drastic power shift is unthinkable short 
of civil war. Marcuse's atempt to convey the possibility of resistance is unconvincing or 
weak, even as he appeals to us to oppose the supposed ‘closed' work he describes. In 
other words, Marcuse cannot provide the locus of resistance to the system, and so opens 
no space in which opposition could emerge. Furthermore, Feenberg asserts that Marcuse 
is wrong to suggest that the individual and society are distinct ‘things' located on the 
same ontological level and interacting with each other (Feenberg 1991: 67).
Rather, Feenberg saw the relationship between the individual and society 
operating in a diferent way. What Marcuse lacked was a theory of technological 
hegemony capable of explaining the relationship of social organizations to 
ideology/science and power/knowledge. Feenberg tries to accommodate such a theory by 
incorporating what he cals the ‘technical code', a phenomenon that aligns technical
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systems to the requirements of a system of domination. Any hegemony is the efect of its 
code, though Feenberg, like Marcuse, concentrates on capitalist hegemony (79).
The term ‘code' has at least two meanings in the social context. The Grst 
meaning of code refers to laws establishing what activities are either permited or 
forbidden, but not necessarily in a legal context. There are al kinds of writen codes of 
this kind to do with al nature of activity; 6om trafBc laws to books on how to take 
pictures. The second sense of the term ‘code' in the sociological context is of unwriten 
laws that are implicit in behavior and atitudes, “which signify a broader range of values 
than the permited or the forbidden" (80). A mundane example of how this kind of 
unwriten code becomes entrenched in narow cultural discourses is how a kind of 
hierarchy of goods becomes established; in a certain segment of the population in 
Northwestern Ontario, a hierarchy of pickup trucks is made apparent to anyone who 
ventures to ask. Which truck is “beter" than another is never based on wide-ranging, 
rigorous scrutiny but is dogmaticaly based on anecdotes and brand loyalty. Which truck 
you drive sends a message about yourself and your values to others. Such codes, it 
seems, have a communicative function.
Feenberg argues that the technical code contains both the ‘writen' and 
‘unwriten' aspects just described. This kind of code has ontological signihcance in a 
society where domination is based on the control of technology to the point where it 
serves as the principle of ‘organizational' identity and survival. ‘To exist," Feenberg 
writes, “organizations must ‘encode' their technical environment, not merely associating 
technology with certain signihers in its very structures" (81). What this means is that 
technologies are more than the sum of their parts; the springs and levers that are
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integrated into individual technologies are a ‘context of constraints' deGned by their 
social environment. They meet the social criterion of purpose in the very selection and 
arangement of the parts 6om which they are made. So, when a particular technology is 
examined, one can Gnd within it a combination of social determinations which “pre- 
construct a domain of social activity aimed at deSnite social goals" (81).
Feenberg gives no example of what he means, but if I understand him corectly, 
the same truck mentioned above could serve as an example; the parts of the truck reveal 
much about those who use it. For instance, the kind of seat or steering wheel, or even the 
temperature controls, shows what the users of the truck demand as suitable comfort.
Even the design of the truck betrays what the users Gnd either atractive or its purpose. 
What's more, the parts not found in a the truck reveal what that particular user group 
does not value. The social codes of truck buyers/users become embodied in the 
technology (i.e., truck) they use.
Another example that could work is the design of the basic personal computer. 
The keyboard in particular sets very definite limitations as to the nature of the user. First, 
the keyboard employs a certain set and number of keys which restrict the number of 
functions a user has available to him, as wel as limiting the number of functions a 
program designer works into a given program. The standard QWERTY key arangement 
requires training to be used efiectively (and, as a curious bit of trivia, it isn't even the 
most eficient arangement).̂ The use of keys in itself restricts access to those with digits 
of some kind, yet the most able users are those with aU ten fingers. Al of these factors 
then afect how programs are designed and thus used. Something as ‘simple' as the 
keyboard betrays a specific domain of social activity with definite goals.
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Feenberg argues that capitalism as a whole has an over-riding technical code, 
clearly revealed in the example of the assembly line:
Its design fulfils the strategic objectives of an influential network 
of management scientists and business leaders because it is more 
than a tool: a strategy of technologicaly enforced labor discipline 
forms the glue that holds together the neutral elements firom which 
it is composed. This asymmetrical efect on power is characteristic 
of a strategicaly encoded technology. (Feenberg 1991: 82)
In the end, it seems that Feenberg is saying something quite similar to Marcuse; that 
within a technologicaly rational system, domination of men over men and men over 
nature is inherent because of the bias inherent within technology itself. Yet Feenberg 
claims that Marcuse's account is unclear with respect to how technical knowledge and 
society relate to one another, mostly because Marcuse does not have the vocabulary or 
terminology to express what Feenberg recognizes as an inherent or implicit “double­
aspect" theory of technology in Marcuse. Feenberg sees Marcuse trying to suggest a pre- 
established harmony of technique and hegemony without reducing one to the other.
Feenberg manages to clarify what he sees Marcuse taking fir granted. Feenberg 
explains that technical advance threatens the hegemony of the ruling groups until it - the 
technology — has been strategicaly encoded. Applications become bound to particular 
hegemonic purposes. So, Feenberg sees two things happening: first, there seems to be a 
connection being made as a result of the similarities between the technical principles 
employed by techniques and hegemonies; second, there is another connection occuring 
in the code which insures that they are coordinated in the application (83). This ‘double­
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aspect' of technology with respect to hegemonies is how Feenberg sees technology and 
social systems relating to one another.
1 immediately see problems with some aspects ofFeenberg's assessment of 
Marcuse. I question Feenberg's assertion that Marcuse implies a double-aspect theory of 
technology. If 1 understand Marcuse corectly, he describes technology or technical 
rationality as the germinating factor of the curent hegemonies, such that technical 
rationality in efect created the curent system; technical rationality is not something that 
is introduced firom outside. Technology, as the physical embodiment of this rationality 
which has formed the system, is inherently applicable to that system. Hegemonies would 
then have no reason to “systematicaly encode" a particular technology, because it would 
inherently be encoded already. Yet Feenberg describes technology as being separate 
from the hegemony, the later relating to the other asymmetricaly, not taking ‘control' by 
virtue of its nature, but rather being “systematicaly employed" by the system.
We have, then, two very big diferences between Marcuse's and Feenberg's 
perception of technology: one, that Marcuse regards technological rationality to be both 
creator and part of a system, while Feenberg describes it as alien; two, Marcuse views 
technology as biased toward domination within a system and also as having a dominating 
efect over a system, while Feenberg says technology, while being biased toward 
domination, stil seems to be within the control of the ‘powers that be' to be 
systematicaly employed. I must in turn question the practical wherewithal of a 
hegemony to actualy ‘strategicaly' encode and employ technology. How, exactly, does 
an organization or hegemony do such a thing? What does it mean to do so? Strategy 
implies wisdom with regards to the eSects of technology within a given system. We
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know that this is impossible, for the greatest problems of technology with relation to man 
and nature do not lie with their intended ends, but always with the unintended ones.
The discrepancies between Marcuse and Feenberg may be arising &om what 
usualy reduces down to a techno-social version of the “chicken or egg" discussion. 
Substahtivists or “total theory" advocates such as Marcuse order efective processes in a 
“top-down" manner, where constructivists like Feenberg order the process as “botom- 
up" as a mater of method and perspective. Feenberg's claim that constructivist 
sociology of technology has introduced diference into the question is, to me, awry; it is 
an entirely new method and so no such introduction is possible.
Despite his atempts to deny it, Feenberg's account of technology belies a deep 
substantive root. He draws heavily 6om Marcuse whose critique of technological 
rationality borders on deterministic. Feenberg goes to great lengths to distance himself 
fom such totalizing concepts, yet to assert a bias - good or bad - in technology as 
Feenberg does is indeed to assert a substance.
3.4: Albert Borgmann
The efects of technology in the digital age are mani&ld, a result of the 
proliferation of digital technologies available, and used, in nearly every area of our daily 
busy-ness - recal Lightman's comments in the introduction about technology enslaving 
us instead of freeing us. Indeed, a synonymous identification of the digital age is ‘the 
information age'. For what is the purpose of al digital technologies but the relay of 
information? Albert Borgmann, professor of philosophy at the University of Montana at 
Missoula, sees digital information technology as both a supreme blessing and curse in
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tenns of the information it makes available and how that in&rmation threatens to 
displace reality.
Borgmann's thinking seems to tie together elements of al the thinkers mentioned 
in this thesis; he certainly draws from Heidegger and other modems, but also fom 
Bandrilard and ofier postmodems. As a result, he echoes much of Kelner and Best's 
crifque of the claims of postmodernism and also suggests solutions similar to those of 
Feenberg. Yet in al of it his position is uniquely his own, particularly because he is a 
proponent ofboth Catholicism and fee market economy.
In 1992, Borgmann published Crossing the Postmodem Divide, in which he, like 
Kelner and Best, crifcizes the postmodem project as not suficiently dealing with the 
problems that new technologies pose to humans and their communities: "If we agree to 
cal this distinctive approach to the reordering of the world ‘modem technology', we 
should put the chalenge to postmodernism by asking whether postmodernism wil be 
more than technology by other means" (Borgmann 1992: 80). There is a distinction here 
that is worth mentioning: Borgmann is speaking about postmodernism as a social 
phenomenon, whereas Kelner and Best are atacking postmodernism's theoretical 
fondations.
So, unlike Kelner and Best, Borgmann argues that we do in fact live in a time 
that is something other than modernism, a time that has postmodem elements reflected in 
the political, economic and social structures.̂ We often hear of our ‘era' as postmodern, 
as resting upon a "postmodem economy" or what has many other names: computer 
economy, information economy, postindustrial, service or electronic economies. Yet 
Borgmann sf cks with ‘postmodern economy' for he recognizes many aspects in it which
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are indeed postmodern, meaning that there has been a relatively quick and radical shiA 
Aom the realism, nniversalism and individualism that marked modem economy to 
information processing, Aexible specialization and informed cooperation. This for 
Borgmann marks a departure Aom the rather brash and heedless practices of modem 
econorüics and toward diversification, niche marketing, and a growing dependency on 
services rather than goods. Banks, for instance, were at one time just a place where 
cautious individuals could put then money for safekeeping, but now customers are 
ofered a slew of services ranging Aom insurance to RRSPs.
Borgmann suggests that despite these ‘postmodem' characteristics, what is seen 
as a progression Aom modernism to postmodernism is more like (as Best and Kelner 
echo) an intensification of modernism - a hypermodemism. Hypermodemism is 
characterized by the problematic characteristics of hyperealism, hyperactivity, and 
hyperinteligence.
Hyperealism refers, in a m;W/y Baudrilardian way, to the way in which digital 
communication technologies and the information they relay are, by Borgmann's 
assessment, ‘more real' than reality itself They're brighter, more interesting, and less 
consequential than real life: "It conforms more fuly to the technological promise of 
liberation from the recalcitrance of things, the confusion of circumstances, and Aibles of 
human beings" (82). Digital information technologies specificaly take experiences out 
of any contextual finmework, making them pliable and rich in content. Ultimately, if the 
technology progresses far enough, al of our senses wil be roused, ofering a ‘beter' 
version of reality. But since it provides experiences outside of any context, hypereahties
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like virtual reality wil ultimately fail in delivering a complete, meaningful experience 
(87).
Hyperactivity is a result of the flexible specialization available in the postmodern 
age. Flexible specialization alows for a much higher level of communication that ever 
before "imagined, to the point where people can begin their work day before they even get 
to the ofice by using such devices as celular phones or personal digital assistants 
(PDAs). Even more, the work day does not even realy have to end, provided there are 
people and methods of geting work done at al hours of the day (97).
Hyperinteligence is the efect of the connectedness of digital communication 
technologies, in that every parcel of knowledge can be stored, accessed and shared at 
wil. Yet this complete access puts the traditional American rights of personal privacy, 
security and liberty at risk, while at the same time ironicaly producing disconnectness - 
hyperinteligence puts technological bariers between the individual, society and other 
individuals, and the so very human activity of face-to-Ace communication and communal 
celebration is being robbed of social resonance (Borgmann, 1992,102 & 106).
As wel, Borgmann argues that this hyperintelhgence threatens our own 
inteligence Ar memory and engagement, much like Plato had Socrates argue of writing 
in the Phaedrus. in that it disburdens us Aom having to remember either the immediacies 
of schedules and tasks to the expanses of history and science, languages and whatever 
else. "[Hyperinteligence]," Borgmann writes, "is obviously growing and thickening, 
sufocating reality and rendering humanity less mindful and inteligent" (108-109). As 
an example, Borgmann refers to a story about Nicholas Negroponte, the MIT professor 
who wrote Beine Digital and is regarded as a champion of digital communication
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technologies. Negroponte apparently stored al of his vital information in his wristwatch, 
yet naturaly the bateries died and al of his information was lost. Negroponte's life was 
turned completely upside-down for about two weeks (107).
The way which we appropriate our world is being direly afected by the 
ubiquitous senses of hyperinteligence:
There is a symmetry between the depth of the world and our bodily 
incursion into it. In the real world, humans have a natural 
inclination to satisfy that symmetry daily through bodily intimacy 
with the world, walking about, feeling the weather, going on 
erands, handling things, and carying burdens.. The 
hyperinteligent sensorium, just because it is so acute and wide- 
ranging, presents the entire world to our eyes and ears and renders 
the remainder of the human body immobile and irelevant. The 
symmetry of world and body fals to the level of a shalow if 
glamorous world and a hyperinkrmed yet disembodied person.
(106)
This efect of digital information technologies on people and society was the 
primary focus of Borgmann's most recent book. Holding onto Reality, published in 1999. 
In it, Borgmaim writes about information and information technology specificaly, yet 
makes some interesting accounts of diferent kinds of information. For instance, 
Borgmann distinguishes between and gives an historical account of natural information, 
cultural information, and technological information. Throughout, information is
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information: what is gained when a person with the requisite inteligence is informed by a 
sign about a thing in a certain context.
"Natural" information, briefly, is inkrmation that is gathered Aom natural signs, 
such as clouds, smoke, animal tracks, or landmarks. People are either informed about 
reality by or are able to construct reality Aom these kinds of signs, ultimately discern 
meaning and thus act. Once present and read, natural information reAeats Aom presence 
until caled back again. An example of this would be the use of natural landmarks to aid 
navigation. Coming Aom the west down the Kaministiqua River, for example, the sight 
of the massive formation known as Mt. McKay once indicated to the voyageurs of the 
North West Company of their proximity to the mouth of the river, of Fort Wiliam at the 
mountain's foot, and of Lake Superior to the other side. The mountain, having been read, 
returns to being merely a mountain once again. The mountain no longer serves this 
purpose, but remains a part of the landscape nonetheless to be read and provide 
inArmation in new ways.
"Cultural" information diAers in that it results Aom artefactual or conventional 
signs which are made and remain separate Aom then natural kin. Cultural inArmation is 
contained in things such as leters, texts, maps, music scores, or architectural plans.
Where natural inArmation is about reality, cultural inArmation is about as wel as Ar 
reality, or for the shaping of reality. The kind of information gathered by artefactual 
signs then has the efect of transArming reality, where the inArmation contained and 
conveyed by cultural signs provides the details A construct, usualy in a physical sense, 
reality. Architectural plans can be read to construct a building - which conveys meaning 
itself — in the same way that scores can be read to construct music, which also conveys
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meaning. Cultural information does not eclipse natural information, but rather enriches
it.
"Technological" inArmation is something more, and thus difArent. Like natural 
and cultural inArmation, technological (or digital) inArmation is about and Ar reality; 
yet it does these things with such Arce that it may one day threaten to in efAct displace 
reality alAgethen
The paradigms of report and recipe are succeeded by Ae paradigm 
of Ae recording. The technological inArmation on a compact disc 
is so detailed and controled that it addresses us virtualy ay reality.
What comes Aom a recording of a Bach cantata on a CD is not a 
report about the cantata nor a recipe - the score - for performing 
Ae cantata, it is m Ae common understanding of music itself 
InArmation through Ae power of technology steps Arward as a 
rival of reality [auAor's emphasis]. (Borgmann 1999:2)
Digital technologies mtroduce such a nearly perfect level of "permanence, perspicuity, 
and pliabAty" A mArmation that no previous kind of technology could achieve, to Ae 
pomt where Ae sign becomes (mis)taken Ar Ae thing itself̂ that "Ae structure of Ae sign 
is as detailed as Ae structure of Ae thing Ae sign refers A" (167 & 181). Music CDs 
oAer a supreme example of Borgmann's statement; Ae music itself̂ being played, has its 
only permanence m Ae memory of Ae listener, and Ae listener can only provide you 
wiA vague inArmation about Ae music itself The sheet music Ar Ae piece has much 
more permanence, but its clarity and usefiAiess depends on Ae musical mteAgence of 
person who is reading it. The CD of Ae music and Ae supportive technology has Ae
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ability to recreate Ae music m its mtended clarity - Borgmann's example is Aat of J. S. 
Bach's CantaA no. 10-yet also alows for one to listen to Ae music on demand today, 
tomorow, or two years Aom now. Yet, "you no longer say that you have information 
about or Ar CanAta no. 10, you have Ae cantata; what your CD player, amplifier and 
speakefs produce is not something Aat is about or Ar Bach's music. It is Ae music 
itself (181). Information eventualy becomes so detached fi-om reality Aat it eventualy 
becomes its rival.
Yet for al of Ae promises that Agitai technology makes, its efect of Asplacing 
reality removes mtelhgence, things, and context Aom Ae normal semantic process. As a 
result, signs are self-suficient and umquely ambiguous. Ambiguity is always a 
possibility wiA any sign, if Ae reader is unable Ar mteUectual or contextual reasons to 
gain suficiently clear meainng; Mt. McKay is just anoAer big rock to Ae casual 
observer, Ae end result of tectomc, volcanic, and glacial Arces. The ambigmty Aat 
technological inArmation mAoduces is new, m that it provides no inArmation about Ae 
world out Aere; it is virtual ambigmty (186).
This ambigmty is clearly evident m "multi-user dungeons," m online communities 
like The Wel, chat-rooms, and onlme games such as EverQuest or Anarchy Onlme. In 
Aese cyberspaces, an mAvidual can and mvariably does construct an entirely new 
identity, an "avatar," peAaps Ae one (or two) he had always wanted m real liA. Wals 
are erected that, as Sherry Tmkle puts it, "create a sense of being m a place apart"
(Tmkle 1984:251). This capabAty blurs fines of truA and fiction, and Ae result is a 
mixture of a new level of Aeedom as wel as confusion. On one hand, hopes can be 
realized; physical hanAcaps can be overcome, Ae meek can be eloquent supeAeroes,
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sexual orientations can be realized. But wiA equal ease, jokes can be played. The 
seriousness of Ae user is never entirely apparent, nor is any oAer detail. In al of this, Ae 
users recognize Aat ambiguity is part of Ae experience (see Turkic 1995: 12).
Stil, many hundreds, if not Aousands of people have met and maried through 
online communities as wel as m online communities. CAline mariages are becoming 
more Aequent m games such as EverQuest. The ceremony takes place m a vibrant 3D 
virtual world wiA a virtual celebrant and congregation. Each participant virtualy Aesses 
m his or her most extravagant armor and gives gifts to Ae couple, usualy virtual money 
which is part of a working virtual economy. Yet Ae emotions mvolved are real. There 
are real people behind Ae avatars, and so Ae lines between reality and virtuality remain 
blured. Borgmann cals this efect of blurring and confusion "virtual fog.” When Ae 
user removes himself Aom Ae community, even if Ar a moment, Ae Ag lifts and Ae 
physical, biological reality resumes; Ae runner is a double amputee again, Ae superhero 
is meek and clumsy again, Ae man is a woman again.
In response to what he sees as Ae development of hypermodemism, Borgmann 
ofers a "genuine alternative” of what he cals "postmodern realism”; he argues that we 
should not be aAaid of technology and turn away Aom iL Besides, Ae possibility Aat Ae 
curent technological progress would be abandoned is unlikely, if not impossAle. RaAer, 
Borgmann suggests that technologies can be positively appropriated, much like 
Feenberg's suggestion of "systematic employment” but without Ae politicaly radical 
implications, through broad education of Ae public in order to produce "Ae existence of 
a literate community and Ae presence of an eloquent reahty” (Borgmann 1992: 116). 
AlAough Ae postmodern condition, or hypermodemism, eclipses Ae natural or
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traditional reality, eloquent reality can occur in a technological sphere as "focal” reality - 
encounters each of us has wiA things that of Aemselves have engaged mind and body 
and centered our lives. "Commanding presence, community wiA Ae world, and 
centering power,” Borgmann writes, "are signs of focal things” (119).
' In short, Borgmann cals Ar community and substance inArmed procedure as Ae 
basis Ar Ae development and employment of technology. This is postmodern realism. 
Borgmann suggests that Christian models of love and community offers one Atmdation 
Ar postmodern realism, Ar Aey aim to mcoiporate contemplation and worship mto Ae 
mAvidual and corporate-asm community - levels of living ( 142). In this regard, he 
echoes Elul and, moreover, Ae great CanaAan social thinker George Grant. Grant, m 
his important work Technologv and Empire, atacks in a broad sweep Ae modem and 
New Left critiques of Western techmcal society, particularly Marcuse's, m Ae end 
arguing Aat Ae solution Marcuse proposes does nothing to change man's relation to 
technology or ĉitalism, Ar Marcuse's utopia presumes Ae same, or beter, standard of 
living oAy made available by Ae very system Marcuse opposes. Grant suggests, m a 
similar fashion as boA Heidegger and Borgmann, that Ae West's abandonment of 
"contemplation” has seriously hindered its abAty to understand and manage itselL 
There is one critical comment that I must make m reference A Borgmann's 
suggestion of a reality that is being threatened by technological information. A reality 
that can be Agged by technology's velocity, but can also be returned A when Ae Ag is 
lifAd, could be argued A be but a mirage of Ae real. As Baudrilard and Ae 
constructivists suggest, what we consider A be a basic reality is stil always already a 
construction. When Ae virtual Ag lifts and, for instance, Ae man becomes a woman
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again, Ae sexual categories implied are specificaly Western. Many cultures do not 
restrict sexuality to merely two distinctions. Despite this modest complaint, Borgmann's 
assessment of Agitai communication technology and its efects on us as mdividuals and 
as a culture echoes m many ways the concerns of modem Aeorists, giving us reason to 
pause ând consider Ae relationship between modem and contemporary technologies.
3.5: Summary of Contemporary Theory
At this pomt, it is possAle to go m a few directions. If what we consider to be 
reality is m efect just as constructed as Ae virtual reality offered by Agitai 
commumcation technologŷ if it is al simAation anyway, Aen we cannot say one reality 
is preferable to anoAer, and so any consequences that may arise are mooL This kind of 
nihilism alows Ar a fid! embrace of virtual existence via Agitai communication 
technology without any sense of consequence. What we can take fiom Borgmann is Ae 
idea that one reality is mdeed preferable to Ae oAer, Aat one is mdeed less a simAation 
than Ae oAer, and that Ae experiences ofered by what is commoAy understood to be 
reality - constructed, simAated, or whatever-are ontologicaly more sigmficant than any 
experience meAated by technologicaly. In a word, Aey are most reA.
This conclusion is arguably HAdeggerian, and Borgmann is not Aone among 
contemporary Aeorists A maintain HAdegger's line of Aought. Hubert Dreyfus presents 
a Kieikegaardian/HAdeggerian perspective m his book On Ae Intemet. m which he 
repeats much of what Borgmann presents m Holding onto Realitv. For Dreyfus, AgitA 
commumcation technologies like Ae mtemA threaten A erode or Asplace Ae more 
phyAcaly direct - and Aus beter — relationships through Aeir mcreased meAation m
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such practices as A stance education. It likewise threatens to produce possessors of false 
knowledge, or even false possessors of knowledge - again, as Plato argued - by alowing 
uneducated voices to make claims about something wiA which Aey have no "true" 
knowledge, claims Aat wil have an influence on an equaly uneducated public.̂ For 
boA Dreyfus and Borgmann - as Ar HAdegger—being "present" m a siAation, wheAer 
wiA nature or anoAer person, ofArs mAviduals and soAeties Ae most direct 
mterpersonA experience Aeir senses can Alow.
In Ae end, we cannot ignore or make light of Ae postmodernist arguments, 
mcluding Aose of Baudrilard, which demystify construAed reAities. But, at Ae same 
time, it is nAve A Alow this project if it degenerAes mto a redwcrio od to Ae
point where Aere is no basis for rational action and ethic, to a nihilism; skepticism is 
heAAy, but wiA moderation. The resAt must be a compromise; postmodernism as a 
state is a myth, but modernism is history.
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4: Thesis Summation
What we find in al of Aese Aeorists, firom ElA through Borgmann, is a thread; a 
thread woven among Aoronghly diferent political and religions ideologies, as wel as 
through Aferent conceptions of technology and reality. This thread is Ae recognition 
Aat instrumental technology is Ae efect of something larger that has many names and 
Aces, be it /d tecAnigue, GarteZZ, or capitalist technological rationality. Contemporary 
Aeorists are reluctant to name such potentialy "essentialist” concepts, yet Aey continue 
to hint at Aem. I woAd argue Aat Aey have no choice. Despite Ae eforts of many 
contemporary Aeorists to avoid loaded modernist terms such as "essence," we have not 
yet completed Ae turn to postmodernism; we stil fal prey to modernist ways of Aought. 
Of course, this turn can only truthfuly said to be ‘in motion’ since the late 1960s, and 
thirty years is oAy a moment m Ae life of a revolution.
The charge of essentialism is one to avoid, if oAy A escape association wiA Ae 
construction of often injurious or oppressive - and Aways exclusive or elitist — categories 
such as gender, race, ethnidty, class, vAue, history, and canon A name just a few. 1 
believe, however, that technology does not belong wiA Aese oAer categories. There is 
nothing oppressive about claiming Ae essence of technology, Ar Ae sense of essence m 
relation to technology is, dare I say, more "true" m Ae Heideggerian sense, and not 
merely a sociA construction that supposes a direct oppoAte. As we have seen m Ae 
modernist account, and particAarly m Heidegger's, technology as essence transcends and 
traverses constructed realities.
For this reason, it is Aficult A talk about technology and not talk about its 
essence, even - eq>eciAly - if you are appealing A any sort of politicA or oAer kind of
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ideology. Indeed, my purpose in this Aesis has been to reinforce Ae essentiAist position 
m a contemporary context. This has been done wiA ful awareness of Ae AeoreticA 
oppositions as wel as Ae generA unpopAarity of this stance. But 1 believe that Ae 
question of Ae essence of technology is something AA cannot be disregarded - no mater 
how mbch one might try. For instance, boA Kelner and Feenberg are flavoured by a 
Marxist agenda, and so cary Marx's substantive baggage that Aey cannot drop, even if 
Feenberg claims oAerwise. Borgmann's arguably conservative democratic politico- 
economics is Aso able to recognize a substantiveness m technology that has oAy 
mrgnsf/ied wiA Ae emergence of AgitA communication/information technologies.
WheAer KeAier's neo-Marxist solution is right or Borgmann's Christian- 
conservative solution is right is not realy A issue. For Ae politicA, economic, and 
culturA aspects of a hegemony, to use Feenberg's language, are more or less determined 
by Ae technologies upon which Aey depend. Again, Ae relationships between politics, 
economics, society, and technology are very much mtertwined, and Asceming Ae 
separations between Aem and Aus Ae influence one has on anoAer requires decades of 
research and anAysis, oAy A made obsolete by Ae rapid progression of technologicA 
development. RaAer, I believe we must deA wiA technology's essence, its ahistoicA 
character, m order to be able to provide a meaningful solution. This is not A say that 
Kelner's and Borgmann's solutions are not meaningfA; Aey are mdeed meaningful 
within Ae systems Aey address, namely Ae hypermodem AgitA era, but oAy Aere. 
Technology has Aways been and wil continue to be humankind's assistant Ar dealing 
wiA Ae world, and as such has no alegiance A a particular polity, economy, Aeology, or 
culture. However, it shoAd be noted thA Western society and al of its associAed
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systems are structured in a robustly technical manner. For this reason, contemporary 
Western society must, more than any oAer society, deal wiA technology itself- as 
something that must be dealt wiA as opposed to something it merely uses neutraly to 
deal wiA Ae world.
4.1: Intensification
The efects of a technical or technological system are brought about by Ae 
technologies used m that system, i.e., by Ae instrumental technologies, Ae political and 
economic techniques, and so on. Feenberg's double-aspect Aeory of technology is useful 
m describmg what 1 see as Ae relationship between technology and Ae technical system. 
They are not entirely distinct Aings, but intimate and intrinsic to one another. 
Technologies are a contributing factor m Ae development of technical systems, and 
systems are a contributive factor m Ae development of technologies.̂ ̂What qualities 
each component has wil be imbued m Ae oAer, and so Feenberg's claim that 
hegemomes - which are m my opinion products of a technical system - can strategicaly 
employ technologies is a typical constructivist claim m that it gives more credit to agency 
than Ae situation woAd seem to alow. Digital communication technologies especialy 
have an extensive impact on Ae structuring of sociA relationships as wel as our own 
appropriation of Ae ‘naturA' world. For this reason, I had wondered if AgitA 
communication technologies were somehow fundamentaly - substantively - Aferent 
than any oAer kind of technology, and if it woAd m turn Acilitate a new kind of 
technicA system AGerent m al respects A Ae modem technicA system and its 
technology.
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But after examining Ae assessments of Heidegger, Elul, Marcuse, and oAer 
modem Aeorists, it became clear that Ae problems and opportunities presented by 
modem technology are very similar A Ae ones presented by current digital 
communication technologies. Granted, some of Ae problems and opportunities presented 
by digW communication technologies are mdeed new and m many ways unique, but at 
its core, its substantive character remains Ae same as it has Aways been, Aom Ae times 
of Ae ancient Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, and Ae technologies which 
gave Aem pause to reflect. The curent technicA system is indeed diferent, but oAy m 
Aat it is more mtense. While oAy mentioned by each, this language of mtensity with 
regard to Ae AgitA era is confirmed by Kelner and Best, and by Borgmann.
The language of mtensity m relation A boA modem and AgitA technology and 
technicA societies has been used or suggested by thinkers ranging Aom Alvin Toffler m 
Future Shock (1970) to Paul Virilio in Speed and Politics (1977). The digital world in 
particAar is marked by exponentiAly mcreasing processing power and speed combmed 
with already massive and continuously growing amounts of information.*̂ The result is 
raAcaly mcreasing amounts of information velocity, and Aus mcreasing mtensity. But 
Ar Kelno", Best, and Borgmann, Ae term mtensity is used oAy m relation A Ae velocity 
of inArmation, or Ae mtensity of technology's efAct on us due to its ever-mcreasing 
power and mtegration. Atensity as I employ it is larger m scope. It mcludes Borgmann 
and KelAer's sense of mtensity, but more broaAy refers A Ae shift m technology's 
overa/Z power and mtegration, and Aus efect; wiA Ae advent of AgitA technology, and 
m particular AgitA communication technology, Ae efect of Ae essence of technology 
has mtensified m its relation A humans and Westem society. Just as Ae modem
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technical system was Ae mtensification of technology Aom whatever system preceded it, 
for instance Ae IndustriA Revolution, Ae curent technicA system is likewise a fuiAer 
mtensification. But AgitA communication technology and Ae AgitA age is mtense m al 
referents, mcluding Ae ones mentioned above. As a resAt, Ae implications of AgitA 
technology and its essence are boA more evident and more pressmg.
To emphasize and Aso summarize, AgitA communication technology is 
Airtoricu/Zy unZgrz/g; it is drasticAly diferent m its design and efects Aan any oAer kind 
of technology so far. This pomt is clear and irefutable. The substantive element of 
AgitA communication technology and of technology as a whole is, on Ae oAer hand, 
AiytoricuZZy cowZs/gnZ; Ae characteristics of technology, eiAer as system or as 
instrument, are Ae same as modem technology. The mtense nature of AgitA 
communication technology is Ae result of an intensification of Ae substantive nature of 
techmque or Ae essence of technology — through Ae efects of AgitA communication 
technology. That this conclusion may be unfashionable in some circles means nothing. 
Declaring Ae essence of anything, as mentioned above, is seen by some as being 
tantamount to mteUectuA suicide. However, 1 cannot conscientiously ignore what I see 
as a substantive element m technology and technicA systems having a determinant efect 
on Westem culture, A boA Ae personA and sociA levels.
Intensification is a key term Ar understanding Ae AgitA era. The term can be 
applied to describe every aspect of technology - boA instrumentA and essentiA - m 
relation to humans and societies. But Ae sense of Ae term mtensity thA concerns this 
Aesis moA is m reference to Ae idea thA Ae AgitA era and its AgitA technology 
represent an mtensification of Ae efiect of technology's essence on humans by way of
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the intensification of bo A Ae technical syAems - technique or technological rationality — 
and Ae instrumental technologies. KelAer, Best, and Borgmann, I believe, are right to 
rebuke some postmodemiA claims that we live m a new era, a postmodern era, and I 
Aink that Borgmann's term hypermodemism is right on Ae mark. The digital era is 
mtense modernism, and is mtensely modem.
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Afterword
Digital communication technology is unlike any oAer technology in history.
Able to process information at a level never beAre imagined, it has opened up entirely 
new worlds Aat rivA our own m many ways, mcluding Ae Aeedom it gives to anyone 
who wishes to uAeash Aeir imaginations and desires. It has not sApped growing, and 
Aere does not seem to be any mdication Aat it wil any time soon. WhA is more, Ae 
AgitA technologies of Amorow wil be more powerful, more flexible, and more 
ubiquitous Aan ever.
The technologies that reach our hands today have been m development Ar years. 
Sometimes, radicA technologies are developed and do not reach Ae public Ar a decade 
or more. The efArts of Ae Xerox PAo Alto Research Center (PARC) over Ae past 
thirty-three years have given birA to laser printing, EAemet technologies, Ae graphicA 
user mterface (GUI), and ubiquitous computing among oAer accomplishments. Even 
now, PARC and oAer corporately funded Sdicon VAley research groups are researching 
and developing nano-technologies, gene-chips, micro-sensors or "smart dust," flexible 
electromcs, al of which are mtended to make information technologies more powerful, 
cheaper, and Atimately more pervasive and ubiqmtous.
The question Ar Ae average consumer or citizen is, "How shoAd I react A AgitA 
technologies?" Of Ae contemporary Aeorists mentioned m this Aesis, Ae solutions vary. 
ElA suggests we pack up and retreat to a more "naturA" seting. Heidegger appeals A 
mcreased artistic expression as a means ofbAancing ofT Ae potentialy negative efects 
of technology. Marcuse hopes Ar a reorganization of Aought and technology m order to 
set technology on its proper course of Asburdening people of labour. Feenberg hopes for
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a reinterpretation of technology Ar similar reasons A Marcuse's, but expands his 
concerns beyond humanity's needs into those of Ae environment. Borgmann suggests 
that we realign our thinking to mclude spiritual practice, Aom worship to serviAde, to 
bAance technology's efActs, a suggestion much like Grant's.
'Win Aese suggestions continue to be viable as technology continues A develop? 
Wül Ae ara of ubiqmtous technology that Ae research laboratories are placing on our 
horizon mvite a Amdamentaly difArent system of Aought and action, or is it gomg to be 
stil more mtensification? If so, how much mtensity can humans withstand? Many 
people have already opted A reject Ae AgitA era m Avour of a less mtense liAstyle, as 
El W has suggested. Throwing out Ae television is one reaction. At least one locA 
couple has opted A Argo urban living and have isolated Aemselves as much as Aey can 
m direct opposition to Ae mtensity of a technicA society. They have constructed a house 
out of wood, mud and hay, have tiled a garden and have been living comArtably - wiA 
children - Ar a Aw years, and Aey are by no means Ae first A do so. ElA himself was 
an advocate of rejecting Ae modem level of mtensity, and even he was not Ae first. As 
mentioned m Ae mtroduction, such sentiments date at least as far back as Ae Romantic 
era, and possAly as far back as Ancient Rome.
1 believe AA if we choose to embrace technology, Heidegger is right m stating 
that we must Aways keep Ae essence of technology - even if just Ae nature of 
technology A change us - Aways m view. This wil be particAarly important as 
advances m areas such as biotechnology are poised A change our very conceptions of 
whA is means A be human, Arever Atering our politicA and ethicA landscape. As 
Francis Fukuyama states m Our PosAuman Future:
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Neuropharmacology has already produced not just Prozac for 
depression and Ritalin to control the unruly behavior of young 
children. As we discover not just corelations but actual molecular 
pathways between genes and traits like inteligence, aggression, 
sexual identity, criminality, alcoholism, and the like, it wil 
inevitably occur to people that they can make use of this 
knowledge for particular social ends. This wil play itself out as a 
series of ethical questions facing individual parents, and also as a 
political issue that may someday come to dominate politics. If 
wealthy parents suddenly have open to them the opportunity to 
increase the inteligence of their children as wel as that of their 
subsequent descendants, then we have the makings of not just a 
moral dilemma but a ful-scale class war. (Fukuyama 2002:16)̂ ̂
Biotechnology is merely one of many curent developments made available by digital 
technologies.
The consequences of a completely digital realm are unknowable. As Borgmann 
demonstrates, digital communication technologies have the clear potential to progress to 
the point of ofering as near a perfect simulation of an event or activity, one that is 
possibly beter than reality. The consequences of such a completely virtual reality are 
much too complex and dependent on variables that we cannot predict from our present 
situation. But if we can leam anything from the thinkers featured in this thesis, it is that 
prediction is not the aim, as entertaining as it might be. Assessment based on a solid
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understanding of history combined with a grasp of the character of technology in relation 
to us and society can keep any amount technological intensity in focus.
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 ̂See 'Tlato's Pharmacy" in Derrida's Disseminations for a critical appraisal of this 
scene.
 ̂Rational action, for Aristotle, is equivalent to moral action or conduct. To act rationaly 
is to conduct oneself in a moral and ethical way. See Book VI of the Nichomachean 
Ethics, section 5(c) (1140a-25 - 1140b-30).
 ̂For some, like Jacques Elul and Herbert Marcuse, the market is a kind of technology as 
wel, or more so a product of a uniquely modem technological kind of rationality.
 ̂Hiroshima was bombed with 'Litle Boy' on August  1945. Camus wrote the article 
on August 7̂, and it was published in the French Resistance newspaper 'Combat' on the 
8̂. Nagasaki was bombed with the larger 'Fat Man' on the 9̂.
 ̂I borrowed the language in these parentheses 6om a wonderful glossary of 
Heideggerian terms compiled by Richard Rorty, which was on some photocopied pages 
folded into the Heidegger text I borowed j&om Du&esne.
 ̂One of the academic writers they atack for laying down many shifting and conflicting 
conceptions of postmodernism is Zygmunt Bauman, whom I have referenced earlier, and 
they refer to die very book I have referenced. I was amused Erst because Bauman is not 
as frenetic as Best and Kelner make him out to be. I was then amused to End that Best 
and Kelner arive at the same conclusion that ultimately Bauman does, that there are 
many diferent postmodemisms. See (Best & Kelner, 1997,22) and (Bauman, 1992,
VÜ). As for my reference to Bauman, it is both suitable and accurate.
 ̂QWERTY, or the Universal key set was developed by the original patent winner of the 
typewriter, Christopher Latham Sholes, some years after the typewriter was developed in
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1868. One theory is that Sholes designed QWERTY to actualy slow down typists who 
were jamming the key bars as the result of being too quick, as wel as a problem in the 
physical design of the typewriter itself Sholes' intent was to arange the keys so that the 
most likely to be struck in close succession were approaching the type point Eom 
opposite sides of the machine.
The most theoreticaly eficient key set was patented by August Dvorak as the 
Dvorak SimpliEed Keyboard (DSK) in 1936. By this time, improvements in typewriters 
alowed for a more efBcient key set, and DSK was designed more for the beneEt of the 
typist. Al of the vowels and the most recurent consonants were aranged on the home 
row, and the result was that around 75% of English words were typeable without having 
to verticaly move your Engers. As wel the design aimed to optimize key stroke 
altemaEon between hands, increasing speed while reducing faEgue and stress.
DSK was a commercial failure, perhaps due to the standardizaEon of QWERTY 
and the consequenEal reluctance of typewriter manufacturers to change producEon, or of 
businessmen to invest Eme and money to retrain their typists. AEer a brief interest, DSK 
faded into obscurity and QWERTY remains the industry standard to this day. Studies 
sEl have not conclusively determined whether or not DSK is actualy Aster, since it 
seems that QWERTY typists manage about the same speed.
However, there are a few who stil advocate the hnplementaEon and wide-spread 
use of DSK. It is possible to download keyboard re-mapping software for nearly every 
kind of operating system, and DSK keyboards are available to purchase if one looks hard 
enough. MicrosoA Windows operating systems have always included DSK as a key-set 
opEon, listed as "Dvorak."
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Like Feenberg, Kelner, and Best, Borgmann is refering to American systems 
spedEcaly and thus not necessarily to others, like Canada's. Yet much of what these 
men say about technological society can be generaly applied to sufBcienEy 'progressed' 
Western states, such as Canada and most European and Asian countries.
 ̂As an aside, Dreyfus fals prey to his own reasoning. Dreyfus efectively confesses in 
the introduction to On The Internet that he had to leam how to use the internet to lend 
some credibility to his writing. He is by no means a master or 'fuly apprenhced' student 
of the internet, its uses, or its efects on individuals or groups. As a result, he fails to 
meet his own standards as a valid commentator on internet technology. This is made 
even more clear by his misunderstanding of how the technology works. For instance, 
much of Dreyfus' commentary rests rqx)n the noEon that one 'surfs' the internet, moving 
Erom one place to another on the now chchéd 'infbrmaEon superhighway.'
UnArtunately, Dreyfus has been misled. Perhaps the Micronesian concepEon of marine 
travel given by Don Ihde in the essay referenced above would help; just as Micronesians 
apparendy do not think that one 'moves through' water to desEnaEons but rather that the 
desEnaEons come to him, one does not 'move through' the internet 6(«n one site to 
another, but rather the sites come to the navigator. One's navigator does not upload itself 
to a site; sites are downloaded by the navigator. "Navigator" itself is a misleading term, 
as is nearly al popular internet terms, and it is unkrtunate that someone as thorough and 
excepEonal as Dreyfus could be so careless in this regard.
This phenomenon of integraEon and "double efect," where each participant efects the 
other, is commonly known among biologists as "co-adaptaEon" or "co-evoluEon," where
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it is recognised that two or more organisms can have evolutionary 'effects' on each other. 
This kind of phenomenon is usualy 6)und in semi-closed biological systems like islands. 
" Moore's Law states that digital processing power doubles roughly every eighteen 
months. Dr. Gordon Moore, co-fbunder of Intel, had observed in a now famous paper 
published in 1965 that the number of transistors per integrated circuit had doubled every 
year in the fbur previous years since such circuits had been introduced. He then predicted 
that the trend would continue. According to Intel, the trend has indeed continued. Their 
Erst chip made in 1971, the 4004, contained 2,250 transistors. The PenEum 4, the latest 
chip, contains 42 milEon, twice as many as the PenEum 3 which was introduced a year 
befbre. See htp :/www.intel.com/research/sEicon/mooreslaw.htm.
This scenario is invesEgated in the Elm GaEaca. in which the main character, Vincent, 
poses as a geneEcaly enhanced person (Jerome) in order to qualify fbr being sent into 
space, fulEEing a childhood dream. In a classic subversion, he employs technology to 
ilegaly hide his geneticaly inherited chance of heart disease and his less-than-perfect 
eyesight Eom his employer and the autboriEes. His character is juxtaposed with that of 
Eugene, a geneEcaly perfect specimen who lacks any moEvaEon to achieve. This is a 
good example of the classical role of science-EcEon as an important means of holding the 
essence of technology up befbre us.
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